

Dax R. Watson [No. 020054]
Gregory M. Monaco [No. 023965]
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CARL ANDERSON and ROSALIE
ANDERSON, individually and as husband
and wife; ROBERT F. BARTON and LYNN
A. BARTON, individually and as husband
and wife; DAVID S. BAUM and JUDY J.
BAUM, individually, as husband and wife,
and as Trustees of the David S. Baum Living
Trust and Judy J. Baum Living Trust;
MELISSA A. BAUM, individually and as
Co-Trustee of the Melissa A. Baum
Irrevocable Trust; KIMBERLY EMERSON,
individually and as Co-Trustee of the
Kimberly Emerson Irrevocable Trust;
TRACY SUE SAPIEN, individually and as
Co-Trustee of the Tracy Sue Sapien
Irrevocable Trust; LAWRENCE A.
BENSON and PHYLLIS E. BENSON,
individually and as husband and wife;
HOWARD R. BERLIN and JOY M.
BERLIN, individually, as husband and wife,
and as Trustees of the Howard R. Berlin
Separate Property Trust, Joy M. Berlin
Separate Property Trust, and Berlin Family
Revocable Trust; BARNETT FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP I, a Texas general
partnership; BARNETT FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP II, a Texas general

CASE NO. _____

COMPLAINT

mdw
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1 partnership; CURTIS S. BEYER, as Trustee
 2 of the Earl and Evelyn Beyer Family Trust;
 3 ALVIN R. BONNETTE, individually and as
 4 Trustee of the Alvin R. Bonnette Revocable
 5 Trust; ALAN BRAMOWETH, individually
 6 and as Beneficiary of the Alan Bramoweth
 7 IRA and the Alan Bramoweth SEP; JOHN L.
 8 BROAN, individually and as Grantor and
 9 Trustee of the John L. Broan 1984 Revocable
 10 Trust; TOLIVER J. BROWN, individually;
 11 STARLIGHT MANAGEMENT CO.,
 12 L.L.C., an Ohio limited liability company;
 13 SUZETTE CINI, individually; JOHN
 14 COTTOM, as Trustee of Cottam Family
 15 Limited Trust; JAMES CURRAN,
 16 individually and beneficiary of the James F.
 17 Curran IRA; MICHAEL DAVIS and
 18 NANCY DAVIS, individually, as husband
 19 and wife, and as Grantors of the Michael and
 20 Nancy Davis Revocable Trust; LISA
 21 DEKTOR, individually; GEORGE F.
 22 DEMBOW, JR., individually and as Trustee
 23 of the Arizona Natural Resources Profit
 24 Sharing Plan and Trust, Trustee of George F.
 25 Dembow III Family Trust, and Trustee of
 26 Ethelanne and George Dembow Family
 27 Trust; JAMES DUTSON, individually;
 28 ROBERT FALKNER and FAITH
 FALKNER, individually, as husband and
 wife, and as Trustees of the Robert and Faith
 Falkner Trust; WILLIAM BRYAN
 FARNEY, individually; IRA GAINES,
 individually; COLIN GASTON,
 individually; WELDON GEORGE,
 individually; LAWRENCE GLENN,
 individually and as Beneficiary of the
 Lawrence Glenn IRA; RICHARD P.
 GLIDDEN and JANET B. GLIDDEN,
 individually and as husband and wife;
 RONALD GORDON, M.D., and MARILYN
 GORDON, individually, as husband and
 wife, as Beneficiaries of Valley Vascular
 Surgeon SPC Profit Sharing Plan, and


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1 Marilyn Gordon as Trustee of the Marilyn H.
 2 Gordon Revocable Trust; HAROLD
 3 (HARRY) GRIES, M.D., individually and
 4 Trustee of the Harold E. Gries Trust;
 5 HAROLD (HANK) GRIES, J.D.,
 6 individually and as Trustee of the Gries
 7 Children's Irrevocable Trust; JERRY
 8 GUNN, individually; PHIL HAMMOND
 9 and COURTNEY HAMMOND,
 10 individually, as husband and wife, and as Co-
 11 Trustees of the Hammond Revocable Trust;
 12 PHIBUSCO, L.L.C., an Arizona limited
 13 liability company; LEE HENRY and
 14 GRETCHEN HENRY, individually, as
 15 husband and wife, and as Trustees of the Lee
 16 and Gretchen Henry Trust; DEAN A.
 17 HOGANSON, individually; DAVID
 18 HOLBROOK, individually; JOHN HOVE,
 19 individually; MH INVESTMENTS, L.L.C.,
 20 an Arizona limited liability company;
 21 MALCOLM H. HOWARD, as Trustee of the
 22 Diane L. Howard Marital Trust; GREGORY
 23 F. HURLEY, individually; SUSAN J.
 24 JOHNSON, individually; JOHN KLOPP,
 25 individually; SWIATOSLAW KUZIW,
 26 individually; JOSEPH F. LADRIGAN,
 27 individually; MARK LEVENTHAL,
 28 individually and as Beneficiary of the
 Bonnybrook Trust; BRIAN E. LEWIS,
 individually; HENRY C. LEWIS III,
 individually; PETER J. LUMIANSKI and
 CHRISTINE M. LUMIANSKI, individually,
 as husband and wife, and Trustees of the
 Peter J. and Christine M. Lumianski
 Revocable Trust; GEOFFREY C.
 MADDOCK, individually; ARTURO
 MARTINEZ, individually; E&J
 PARTNERS, L.P., a Pennsylvania limited
 partnership; JOHN MAULHARDT,
 individually; JACK MCELLIGOTT,
 individually; DOUGLAS MCFETTERS and
 DONNA V. MCFETTERS, individually, as
 husband and wife, and Beneficiaries of the


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1 Douglas McFetters and Donna McFetters
 2 IRAs; IONA CAPITAL, L.L.C., a Nevada
 3 limited liability company; MATTHEW J.
 4 MANNINO, D.C., individually; Gary Meyer
 5 and Deborah Meyer, individually and as
 6 husband and wife; V. JEROME MIRKIL,
 7 M.D., individually; JULIE ANN MONSON,
 8 individually; ARNOLD H. MOSCHIN,
 9 individually; GEORGE O'CONNOR,
 10 individually; RALPH A. STURGES & CO.,
 11 L.L.C., a Texas limited liability company;
 12 RICK "MAURICE" O'CONNOR,
 13 individually and as Trustee of the
 14 Irrevocable Trust of Coral B. Clifford;
 15 RALPH S. O'CONNOR, individually;
 16 RAFAEL PENUNURI and ROSE
 17 PENUNURI, individually and as husband
 18 and wife; DEAN P. PHYPPERS, individually;
 19 PHYPPERS INVESTMENT CO., L.L.C., a
 20 Virginia limited liability company;
 21 BRENDA RINGWALD, individually;
 22 WAYNE RISH, individually and as
 23 Beneficiary of the Nelson Wayne Rish IRA;
 24 BOUGAINVILLEA INVESTMENTS, L.P.,
 25 an Arizona limited partnership; MANNY
 26 ROOHANIPUR, M.D., individually as
 27 Trustee of the M. Roohanipur M.D. Pension
 28 Trust and the Sean Armani Roohanipur
 Trust; THE ROOHANIPUR FAMILY
 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Nevada
 limited partnership; MANNY AND
 DOREEN ROOHANIPUR FAMILY
 PRIVATE FOUNDATION, INC., a
 California non-profit foundation; STEPHEN
 ROSS, individually; E. PETER RUDDY,
 individually; DONALD E. RUTTEN and
 IRENE G. RUTTEN, individually, as
 husband and wife, and Trustees of the
 Donald E. Rutten Revocable Trust; GAREN
 D. SAILORS and JANICE E. SAILORS,
 individually and as husband and wife;
 HUGO SANTIBANEZ, individually;
 DONALD F. SAVAGE and KATHLEEN R.


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1 SAVAGE, individually and as husband and
 2 wife; GERALD J. SCHLAF and
 3 KATHLEEN SCHLAF, individually, as
 4 husband and wife, and Gerald J. Schlaf as
 5 Grantor and Trustee of the Gerald J. Schlaf
 6 Living Trust; DON SCHNEEBERGER,
 7 individually; FRANK W. SCIACCA and
 8 KAREN L. SCIACCA, individually and as
 9 husband and wife; MARVIN SILVEY,
 10 M.D., individually; DOUGLAS R. SMITH,
 11 individual and as Beneficiary of IRA FBO
 12 Douglas R. Smith; VINCENT SPICA,
 13 individually, as Trustee of the Vincent Spica
 14 Living Trust, and as Beneficiary of IRA FBO
 15 Vincent P. Spica; ROSEMARIE
 16 STAEBELL, individually and as Trustee of
 17 the John B. & Rosemarie Staebell Trust;
 18 LISA J. STIMMEL, D.D.S., individually;
 19 HUBERTUS J. H. SWEERING,
 20 individually; RONALD D. TUCKER,
 21 individually; CHARLES WARNER,
 22 individually; JACK W. WILEY,
 23 individually; DEBORAH L. WILSON,
 24 M.D., and VINICIO LLUBERES, M.D.,
 25 individually, as husband and wife, and as
 26 Beneficiaries of First Trust Company of
 27 Onaga accounts; DAVID ZINN, M.D.,
 28 individually; MARK A. ZIVIN, individually;
 and MARGIE M. ZIVIN, individually,

Plaintiffs,

v.

23 GREGORY K. MCGRATH, individually;
 24 JOHN A. ENSIGN, individually; DANIEL
 25 P. BUETTIN, individually; THOMAS
 26 THISTLETON, individually; SEAN D.
 27 CURRAN, individually; CHARLES V.
 28 SHAMBLEE III, individually; CHRIS A.
 LEWIS, individually; RONALD J. RAPP,
 individually; JAY HILL, individually; J.
 ROBERT ROUTT, individually; DEWAAY

FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC., an Iowa corporation; DEWAAY FINANCIAL NETWORK, L.L.C., an Iowa limited liability company; DEWAAY CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, INC., an Iowa corporation; LAWRENCE LABINE, individually; D8 FUNDING I, LLLP, an Iowa limited liability limited partnership; D8 FUNDING MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Iowa limited liability company; D8 NOTE PURCHASE, LLLP, an Iowa limited liability limited partnership; D8 NOTE PURCHASE MANAGEMENT, LLC, an Iowa limited liability company; D8 ACQUISITION CORP., a Delaware corporation, LAWRENCE LABINE, individually; JOHN AND JANE DOES I-X, ABC CORPORATIONS I-X; and XYZ PARTNERSHIPS, I-X,

Defendants.

For their Complaint against Defendants, Plaintiffs allege the following upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own acts and upon information and belief as to all other matters. Plaintiffs' allegations that are based upon information and belief are supported by investigation, including: (1) review and analysis of: (a) extensive correspondence from various Defendants between 2004 and 2009, (b) board presentation materials for 2007 and 2008, (c) assorted presentation materials prepared by or at the direction of various Defendants for Plaintiffs and other investors in connection with the subject securities offerings, (d) private placement memoranda for those offerings, and (e) financial projections and other financial information for the company on whose behalf Defendants made those offerings; (2) interviews and conversations with former directors

1 and officers of the company and other persons with knowledge of the affairs alleged
2 herein; (3) examination of relevant filings, press releases, and other public statements made
3 by the company, various Defendants, and their affiliated companies that were involved
4 with the affairs alleged herein; (4) review and analysis of court filings from the company's
5 bankruptcy, *In Re: Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., et al.*, Case No. 09-35789; and (5)
6 review and analysis of media reports and additional materials. Many of the facts related to
7 Plaintiffs' allegations are known only by the Defendants named herein and are exclusively
8 within their custody or control. Plaintiffs believe that substantial additional evidentiary
9 support for the allegations set forth below will be developed after a reasonable opportunity
10 for discovery.

11 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

12
13 1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these claims pursuant to
14 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).

15
16 2. Further, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
17 state law causes of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

18
19 3. Venue of this suit lies in the District of Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
20 § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims alleged herein
21 occurred within the District of Arizona, as more specifically described below.

22 **PARTIES**

23
24 4. Plaintiffs invested in securities offered by D8 2010 Inc., fka Domin-8
25 Enterprise Solutions, Inc. ("Domin-8, Inc.") and its predecessor limited liability company,
26 D8 2010 LLC, fka Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, LLC ("Domin-8, LLC") (sometimes
27
28

collectively referred to as, “Domin-8” or the “Company”), whose directors, officers, and brokers directly and / or indirectly targeted investors¹ in Maricopa County, Arizona and elsewhere.

5. In connection with the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendants directly or indirectly used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, the mails and interstate telephonic and electronic communications, to sell securities to Plaintiffs.

6. Plaintiff Carl Anderson and Rosalie Anderson are Florida residents. Plaintiff invested a total of \$270,200 in the Company, with: (a) \$95,200 having been invested in Series A Preferred Stock on or about December 27, 2006; (b) \$25,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series A Subordinated Debentures on or about June 27, 2007; (c) \$100,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about April 8, 2008; and (d) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures on or about June 26, 2009.

7. Plaintiffs Robert F. Barton and Lynn Barton are Arizona residents. Plaintiffs invested a total of \$485,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$200,000 having been invested by Plaintiff Robert F. Barton in Series A Preferred Stock on or about February 6, 2007; (b) \$175,000 having been invested by Plaintiff Lynn Barton in the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about February 9, 2008; and (c) \$110,000

¹ Plaintiffs are also referred to as “Investors” throughout this Complaint.

1 having been invested by Plaintiff Lynn Barton in Common Stock on or about February 25,
2 2008.

3
4 8. Plaintiffs David S. Baum and Judy J. Baum are Florida residents. Plaintiffs
5 invested a total of \$1.75 M in the Company, with: (a) \$1.5 M having been invested in
6 Series A Preferred Stock, with the corresponding number of shares held in the David S.
7 Baum Living Trust, of which Plaintiff David S. Baum is trustee, on or about June 8, 2007;
8 and (b) \$250,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred Stock, with the corresponding
9 number of shares held in the Judy J. Baum Living Trust, of which Plaintiff Judy J. Baum is
10 trustee, on or about June 8, 2007.
11

12
13 9. Plaintiff Melissa A. Baum is a Texas resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
14 \$250,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in Series A Preferred
15 Stock, which was held in the Melissa A. Baum Irrevocable Trust, on or about June 8, 2007.
16

17 10. Plaintiff Kimberly Emerson is a South Carolina resident. Plaintiff invested a
18 total of \$250,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in Series A
19 Preferred Stock, with the corresponding number of shares held in the Kimberly Emerson
20 Irrevocable Trust, on or about June 8, 2007.
21

22 11. Plaintiff Tracy Sue Sapien is a Texas resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
23 \$250,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in Series A Preferred
24 Stock, with the corresponding number of shares held in the Tracy Sue Sapien Irrevocable
25 Trust, on or about June 8, 2007.
26

27 12. Plaintiffs Lawrence A. Benson and Phyllis E. Benson are Arizona residents.
28 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$300,000 in the Company, with \$200,000 and \$100,000,

1 respectively, having been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
2 Debentures on or about June 12, 2006, and September 21, 2006. As set forth more fully
3 below, said investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company
4 January 8, 2007.
5

6 13. Plaintiffs Howard R. Berlin and Joy M. Berlin are Arizona residents.
7 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$1 M in the Company, with \$500,000 having been separately
8 invested in the amounts of \$250,000 each on two separate occasions in the 2005 Series C
9 Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in the
10 names of the Howard R. Berlin Separate Property Trust and Joy M. Berlin Separate
11 Property Trusts, which are established under the Berlin Family Revocable Trust and of
12 which Plaintiffs Howard R. Berlin and Joy M. Berlin are trustees, on or about May 23,
13 2005 and December 12, 2005, respectively. As set forth more fully below, said
14 investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about
15 January 8, 2007.
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19 14. Plaintiff Barnett Family Partnership I, appearing through manager Laurie
20 Werner, is a Texas general partnership. Plaintiff invested a total of \$528,000 in the
21 Company, with: (a) \$278,000 having been invested in Class B Preferred Units on or about
22 August 31, 2004; (b) \$125,000 having been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated
23 Convertible Debentures on or about May 10, 2006; and (c) \$125,000 having been invested
24 in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about June 26, 2006. As
25 set forth more fully below, said investments were automatically converted into Common
26 Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
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1 15. Plaintiff Barnett Family Partnership II, appearing through manager Laurie
2 Werner, is a Texas general partnership. Plaintiff invested a total of \$653,000 in the
3 Company, with: (a) \$278,000 having been invested in Class B Preferred Units on or about
4 August 31, 2004; (b) \$250,000 having been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated
5 Convertible Debentures on or about May 10, 2006; and (c) \$125,000 having been invested
6 in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about June 26, 2006. As
7 set forth more fully below, said investments were automatically converted into Common
8 Stock in the Company January 8, 2007.

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11 16. Plaintiffs Earl A. Beyer and Evelyn T. Beyer are California residents.
12 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$200,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$150,000 having been
13 invested in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, which was held in the Earl
14 and Evelyn Beyer Family Trust, of which Plaintiff Curtis S. Beyer is trustee and who has
15 authority from Plaintiffs Earl A. Beyer and Evelyn T. Beyer to bring this action, on or
16 about October 20, 2008; and (b) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2008 Series D Senior
17 Subordinated Debentures, which was held in the Earl and Evelyn Beyer Family Trust, of
18 which Plaintiff Curtis S. Beyer is trustee and who has authority from Plaintiffs Earl A.
19 Beyer and Evelyn T. Beyer to bring this action, on or about April 1, 2008

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22 17. Plaintiff Alvin R. Bonnette is a New Hampshire resident. Plaintiff invested a
23 total of \$100,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007
24 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of
25 units held in the Alvin R. Bonnette Revocable Trust, of which Plaintiff Alvin R. Bonnette
26 is trustee, on or about May 12, 2008.
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1 18. Plaintiff Alan Bramoweth is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
2 \$155,600 in the Company, with: (a) \$55,600 having been invested in Class B Preferred
3 Units, with the corresponding number of units held in the Alan Bramoweth IRA, of which
4 Plaintiff Alan Bramoweth is beneficiary, on or about October 28, 2004; (b) \$50,000 having
5 been invested in Class B Preferred Units, with the corresponding number of units held in
6 the Alan Bramoweth SEP, of which Plaintiff Alan Bramoweth is beneficiary, on or about
7 October 28, 2004; and (c) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C Subordinated
8 Convertible Debentures on or about November 15, 2005. As set forth more fully below,
9 said investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or
10 about January 8, 2007.
11

12 19. Plaintiff John L. Broan is an Arizona Resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
13 \$25,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C
14 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, which were held in the John L. Broan 1984
15 Revocable Trust, of which Plaintiff John L. Broan is grantor and trustee, on or about May
16 1, 2008.
17

18 20. Plaintiff Toliver J. Brown is a Nevada resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
19 \$57,254 in the Company, with: (a) \$7,214 having been invested in Common Units on or
20 about December 9, 2003; and (b) \$50,040 having been invested in Class B Preferred Units
21 on or about July 1, 2004. As set forth more fully below, said investments were
22 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
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24 21. Plaintiff Starlight Management Co., L.L.C., appearing through its manager
25 James Chalfie, is an Ohio limited liability company. Plaintiff invested a total of \$200,000
26
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1 in the Company, with: (a) \$100,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred Stock on
2 or about February 9, 2007; and (b) \$100,000 having been invested the 2007 Series C Senior
3 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about March 28, 2007.
4

5 22. Plaintiff Suzette Cini is a Michigan resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
6 \$75,000 in the company, with: (a) \$25,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series A
7 Subordinated Debentures on or about December 30, 2007; and (b) \$50,000 having been
8 invested in the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about
9 April 14, 2008.
10

11 23. Plaintiff John Cottam, appearing as trustee of the Cottam Family Limited
12 Trust, is a Florida resident. Plaintiff, as trustee, invested a total of \$100,000 in the
13 Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C Senior
14 Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in the
15 Cottam Family Limited Trust, on or about March 17, 2008.
16

17 24. Plaintiff James Curran, M.D., is a Wisconsin resident. Plaintiff invested a
18 total of \$75,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$25,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series
19 C Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of shares held in
20 an IRA FBO James F. Curran, in or about 2005; (b) \$50,000 having been invested in Series
21 A Preferred Stock, with the corresponding number of shares held in an IRA FBO James F.
22 Curran, on or about February 27, 2007. As set forth more fully below, said investment in
23 the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures was automatically converted into
24 Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
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27
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1 25. Plaintiffs Michael Davis and Nancy Davis are Iowa residents. Plaintiffs
2 invested a total of \$25,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the
3 2007 Series B Subordinated Debenture, with the corresponding number of units held in the
4 Michael and Nancy Davis Revocable Trust, of which Plaintiff Michael Davis and Nancy
5 Davis are grantors, on or about October 5, 2007.
6

7 26. Plaintiff Lisa Dektor is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
8 \$125,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$25,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C
9 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about January 6, 2006; and (b) \$100,000
10 having been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or
11 about September 19, 2006. As set forth more fully below, investments in the 2005 Series C
12 Subordinated Convertible Debentures and the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
13 Debentures were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about
14 January 8, 2007.
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18 27. Plaintiff George F. Dembow, Jr. is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a
19 total of \$275,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$50,000 in the 2005 Series C Subordinated
20 Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in the Arizona
21 Natural Resources Profit Sharing Plan and Trust, of which Plaintiff George F. Dembow, Jr.
22 is trustee, on or about May 31, 2005; (b) \$50,000 in the 2005 Series C Subordinated
23 Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in the George F.
24 Dembow III Family Trust, of which Plaintiff George F. Dembow III is trustee, on or about
25 September 12, 2006; (c) \$125,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series C Senior
26 Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in the
27
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1 Ethelanne and George Dembow Family Trust, of which Plaintiff George F. Dembow, Jr. is
2 trustee, on or about April 16, 2008; and (d) \$50,000 in the 2007 Series C Senior
3 Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in the
4 Arizona Natural Resources Profit Sharing Plan and Trust, of which Plaintiff George F.
5 Dembow, Jr. is trustee, on or about April 16, 2008. As set forth more fully below,
6 investments in the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures were automatically
7 converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
8

10 28. Plaintiff James Dutson is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
11 \$100,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2006 Series D
12 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about September 19, 2006. As set forth more
13 fully below, said investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the
14 Company on or about January 8, 2007.
15

17 29. Plaintiffs Robert Falkner and Faith Falkner are Arizona residents. Plaintiffs
18 invested a total of \$75,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the
19 2008 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding
20 number of units held in the Robert and Faith Falkner Trust, of which Plaintiffs Robert
21 Falkner and Faith Falkner are trustees, on or about May 7, 2008.
22

23 30. Plaintiff William Bryan Farney is a Texas resident. Plaintiff invested a total
24 of \$225,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$75,000 having been invested in Class B Preferred
25 Units on or about October 18, 2004; (b) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2006 Series D
26 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about June 29, 2006; and (c) \$100,000 having
27 been invested in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, upon information and
28

1 belief, in or about 2008 or 2009. As set forth more fully below, investments in Class B
2 Preferred Units and the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures were
3 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
4

5 31. Plaintiff Ira Gaines is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
6 \$200,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C
7 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about October 24, 2005; (b) \$50,000 having
8 been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about
9 March 22, 2006; and (c) \$100,000 having been invested in Domin-8 Enterprise Inc. Series
10 A Preferred Stock on or about June 1, 2007. As set forth more fully below, investments in
11 the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and the 2006 Series D
12 Subordinated Convertible Debentures were automatically converted into Common Stock in
13 the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
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17 32. Plaintiff Colin Gaston is a British citizen. Plaintiff invested a total of
18 \$50,000 in the Company, with said amount having been in the 2008 Series C Senior
19 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about January 13, 2008.
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21 33. Plaintiff Weldon George is a Texas resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
22 \$50,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2008 Series C
23 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about January 29, 2008.
24

25 34. Plaintiff Lawrence Glenn is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
26 \$200,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$50,000 having been invested in Domin-8 Enterprise
27 Inc. Series A Preferred Stock on or about February 6, 2007; (b) \$50,000 having been
28 invested in the 2008 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about

1 March 17, 2008; and (c) \$100,000 having been invested in the 2008 Series D Senior
2 Subordinated Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in an IRA FBO
3 Lawrence Glenn, on or about November 29, 2008.
4

5 35. Plaintiffs Richard P. Glidden and Janet B. Glidden are Michigan residents.
6 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$50,000 in the Company, with said amount having been
7 invested in the 2008 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about
8 April 10, 2008.
9

10 36. Plaintiffs Ronald Gordon, M.D., and Marilyn Gordon are Arizona residents.
11 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$455,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$100,000 having been
12 invested by Plaintiff Marilyn Gordon, as trustee of the Marilyn H. Gordon Revocable
13 Trust, in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about March 21,
14 2006; (b) \$200,000 having been separately invested in the amounts of \$100,000 each on
15 two separate occasions by Plaintiff Ronald Gordon, M.D., and Plaintiff Marilyn Gordon in
16 the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about June 27, 2006, and
17 October 17, 2006, respectively; (c) \$100,000 having been separately invested in the
18 amounts of \$50,000 each by Plaintiff Ronald Gordon, M.D., and Plaintiff Marilyn Gordon
19 in Series A Preferred Stock on or about March 21, 2007; and (d) \$55,000 having been
20 invested by Valley Vascular Surgeon SPC Profit Sharing Plan, of which Plaintiff Ronald
21 Gordon, M.D., and Plaintiff Marilyn Gordon are beneficiaries, on or about March 21, 2007.
22 As set forth more fully below, investments in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
23 Debentures were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about
24 January 8, 2007.
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1 37. Plaintiff Harold (Harry) Gries, M.D. is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff
2 invested a total of \$400,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$100,000 having been invested by
3 Plaintiff Harold (Harry) Gries, M.D., as trustee on behalf of the Harold E. Gries Trust, in
4 the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about October 27, 2006; (b)
5 \$200,000 having been invested by Plaintiff Harold (Harry) Gries, M.D., as trustee on
6 behalf of the Harold E. Gries Trust, in the 2007 Series A Subordinated Debentures on or
7 about July 6, 2007; and (c) \$100,000 having been invested in the 2008 Series C Senior
8 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about January 7, 2008. As set forth more fully
9 below, investments in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures were
10 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
11

12 38. Plaintiff Harold (Hank) Gries, J.D. is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested
13 a total of \$100,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2008
14 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of
15 units held in the Gries Children's Irrevocable Trust, of which Plaintiff Harold (Hank)
16 Gries, J.D. is trustee, on or about April 7, 2008.
17

18 39. Plaintiff Jerry Gunn is a Texas resident. Plaintiff invested a total of \$57,124
19 in the Company, with: (a) \$7,124 having been invested in Common Units on or about
20 December 3, 2003; and (b) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C
21 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about May 11, 2005. As set forth more fully
22 below, said investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company
23 on or about January 8, 2007.
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602/778-9900

1 40. Plaintiffs Phil Hammond and Courtney Hammond are Arizona residents.
2 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$30,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$10,000 having been
3 invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the
4 corresponding number of units held in the Hammond Revocable Trust, of which Plaintiffs
5 Phil Hammond and Courtney Hammond are co-trustees, on or about September 26, 2006;
6 and (b) \$20,000 having been invested in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
7 Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in the Hammond Revocable
8 Trust, of which Plaintiffs Phil Hammond and Courtney Hammond are co-trustees, on or
9 about November 14, 2008. As set forth more fully below, investments in the 2006 Series D
10 Subordinated Convertible Debentures were automatically converted into Common Stock in
11 the Company on or about January 8, 2007.

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14
15 41. Plaintiff Phibusco, LLC, appearing through its managing member, Phil
16 Hammond, is an Arizona limited liability company. Plaintiff invested a total of \$60,000 in
17 the Company, with: (a) \$25,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C Subordinated
18 Convertible Debentures on or about December 2, 2005; (b) \$10,000 having been invested
19 in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about September 26,
20 2006; and (c) \$25,000 having been invested in the 2008 Series C Senior Subordinated
21 Convertible Debentures on or about April 13, 2008. As set forth more fully below,
22 investments in the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2006 Series D
23 Subordinated Convertible Debentures were automatically converted into Common Stock in
24 the Company on or about January 8, 2007.

1 42. Plaintiffs Lee Henry and Gretchen Henry are Arizona residents. Plaintiffs
2 invested a total of \$50,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$25,000 having been invested in the
3 2008 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding
4 number of units held in the Lee and Gretchen Henry Trust, of which Plaintiffs Lee Henry
5 and Gretchen Henry are trustees, on or about February 15, 2008; and (b) \$25,000 having
6 been invested in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, with the
7 corresponding number of units held in the Lee and Gretchen Henry Trust, of which
8 Plaintiffs Lee Henry and Gretchen Henry are trustees, on or about October 30, 2008.

9 43. Plaintiff Dean A. Hoganson is an Iowa resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
10 \$25,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series B
11 Subordinated Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held by TD Ameritrade
12 Cust. FBO Dean A. Hoganson, on or about August 2008.

13 44. Plaintiff David Holbrook is a New York resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
14 \$310,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$110,000 having been invested in Common Units on
15 or about September 22, 2004; (b) \$100,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C
16 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about June 11, 2005; and (c) \$100,000 having
17 been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about May
18 2, 2006. As set forth more fully below, said investments were automatically converted into
19 Common Stock in the Company January 8, 2007.

20 45. Plaintiff John Hove is a Florida resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
21 \$250,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2008 Series C
22 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about March 20, 2008.

1 46. Plaintiff MH Investments, LLC, appearing through its managing member
2 Malcolm H. Howard, is an Arizona limited liability company. Plaintiff invested a total of
3 \$655,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$350,000 having been invested in Common Stock in
4 Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc. on or about September 9, 2006; (b) \$150,000 having
5 been invested in Series A Preferred Stock on or about December 15, 2006; (c) \$50,000
6 having been invested in the 2008 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on
7 or about February 6, 2008; (d) \$55,000 having been invested in Common Stock in Domin-
8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc. on or about February 8, 2008; and (e) \$50,000 having been
9 invested in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures on or about October 20,
10 2008.
11

12 47. Plaintiff Malcolm H. Howard is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a
13 total of \$605,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$200,000 having been invested in Common
14 Stock in Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., with the corresponding number of shares
15 being held in the Diane L. Howard Marital Trust, of which Plaintiff Malcolm H. Howard is
16 trustee, on or about October 5, 2006; (b) \$300,000 having been invested in Series A
17 Preferred Stock, with the corresponding number of shares being held in the Diane L.
18 Howard Marital Trust, of which Plaintiff Malcolm H. Howard is trustee, on or about
19 December 15, 2006; (c) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2008 Series C Senior
20 Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of units being held
21 in the Diane L. Howard Marital Trust, of which Plaintiff Malcolm H. Howard is trustee,
22 on or about February 6, 2008; and (d) \$55,000 having been invested in Common Stock in
23 Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., with the corresponding number of shares being held in
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1 the Diane L. Howard Marital Trust, of which Plaintiff Malcolm H. Howard is trustee, on or
2 about February 8, 2008.

3
4 48. Plaintiff Gregory F. Hurley is a New York resident. Plaintiff invested a total
5 of \$125,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C
6 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures in or about November 2008.

7
8 49. Plaintiff Susan J. Johnson is a Michigan resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
9 \$75,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$50,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred
10 Stock on or about December 28, 2006; and (b) \$25,000 having been invested in Series A
11 Subordinated Debenture-Debt on June 14, 2007.

12
13 50. Plaintiff John Klopp is a Minnesota resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
14 \$25,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C
15 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about April 11, 2008.

16
17 51. Plaintiff Swiatoslaw Kuziw is a New Jersey resident. Plaintiff invested a
18 total of \$250,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2008
19 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures on or about March 19, 2008.

20
21 52. Plaintiff Joseph F. Ladrigan is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total
22 of \$25,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2005 Series C
23 Subordinated Convertible Debentures in April 8, 2005. As set forth more fully below, said
24 investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about
25 January 8, 2007.

26
27 53. Plaintiff Mark Leventhal is a Massachusetts resident. Plaintiff invested a
28 total of \$625,100 in the Company, with: (a) \$325,100 having been invested in the Class B

1 Preferred Units, with the corresponding number of units held in the Bonnybrook Trust, of
2 which Plaintiff Mark Leventhal is beneficiary, on April 2004; and (b) \$300,000 having
3 been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the
4 corresponding number of units held in the Bonnybrook Trust, of which Plaintiff Mark
5 Leventhal is beneficiary, on or about March 1, 2006. As set forth more fully below, said
6 investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about
7 on or about January 8, 2007.

10 54. Plaintiff Brian E. Lewis is a California resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
11 \$50,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C
12 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about February 2, 2008.

14 55. Plaintiff Henry C. Lewis III is a Florida resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
15 \$100,000 in the company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series A
16 Subordinated Debentures on or about August 29, 2007.

18 56. Plaintiffs Peter J. Lumianski and Christine M. Lumianski are Arizona
19 residents. Plaintiffs invested a total of \$127,200 in the Company, with: (a) \$22,200 having
20 been invested in the Class B Preferred Units, with the corresponding number of units held
21 in the Peter J. and Christine M. Lumianski Revocable Trust, of which Plaintiffs Peter J.
22 Lumianski and Christine M. Lumianski are trustees, on or about November 29, 2004; (b)
23 \$25,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures,
24 with the corresponding number of units held in the Peter J. and Christine M. Lumianski
25 Revocable Trust, of which Plaintiffs Peter J. Lumianski and Christine M. Luminaski are
26 trustees, on or about November 16, 2005; (c) \$30,000 having been invested in Series A
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1 Preferred Stock, with the corresponding shares held in the Peter J. and Christine M.
2 Lumianski Revocable Trust, of which Plaintiffs Peter J. Lumianski and Christine M.
3 Luminaski are trustees, on or about March 7, 2007; and (d) \$50,000 having been invested
4 in the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding
5 number of units held in the Peter J. and Christine M. Lumianski Revocable Trust, of which
6 Plaintiffs Peter J. Lumianski and Christine M. Luminaski are trustees, on or about February
7 21, 2008. As set forth more fully below, investments in the Class B Preferred Units and
8 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures were automatically converted into
9 Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.

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12
13 57. Plaintiff Geoffrey C. Maddock is a citizen of the United Kingdom. Plaintiff
14 invested a total of \$150,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the
15 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about February 5, 2008.

16
17 58. Plaintiff Arturo Martinez is a California resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
18 \$250,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C
19 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about June 2, 2008.

20
21 59. Plaintiff E&J Partners, L.P., appearing through Plaintiff Ellis Mathews on
22 behalf of Plaintiff E&J Partners, L.P.'s general partner, the Ellis J. Mathews Amended and
23 Restated Revocable Trust, is a Pennsylvania limited partnership. Plaintiff invested a total
24 of \$48,900 in the Company, with: (a) \$28,900 having been invested in the Class B
25 Preferred Units on or about July 1, 2004; and (b) \$20,000 having been invested in the 2006
26 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about June 26, 2006. As set forth
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28

1 more fully below, said investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in
2 the Company on or about January 8, 2007.

3
4 60. Plaintiff John Maulhardt is a California resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
5 \$50,000 in the Company, with said investment having been invested in the 2007 Series C
6 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about July 1, 2008.

7
8 61. Plaintiff Jack McElligott is a Texas resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
9 \$310,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$75,000 having been invested in the Class A Preferred
10 Units on or about March 28, 2003; (b) \$69,000 having been invested in Common Units on
11 or about November 15, 2003; (c) \$66,000 having been invested in Class B Preferred Units
12 on or about April 28, 2004; and (d) \$100,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C
13 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about May 23, 2005. As set forth more fully
14 below, said investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company
15 on or about January 8, 2007.

16
17
18 62. Plaintiffs Douglas McFetters and Donna V. McFetters are Arizona residents.
19 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$150,000.00 in the Company, with: (a) \$135,000 having been
20 invested by Plaintiff Douglas McFetters in the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible
21 Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in the Douglas McFetters IRA, on
22 or about June 1, 2005 and August 29, 2005; and (b) \$15,000 having been invested by
23 Plaintiff Donna V. McFetters in the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures,
24 with the corresponding number of units held in the Donna McFetters IRA, on or about June
25 1, 2005.

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1 63. Plaintiff Iona Capital, LLC, appearing through its managing member Peter
2 McSorley, is a Nevada limited liability company. Plaintiff invested a total of \$100,000 in
3 the Company, with: (a) \$25,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred Stock on or
4 about December 14, 2006; and (b) \$75,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series C
5 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about April 15, 2008.

6
7 64. Plaintiff Matthew J. Mannino, D.C. is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested
8 a total of \$967,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$111,200 having been invested in Domin-
9 8 Class B Units on or about October 19, 2004; (b) \$305,800 having been invested in Domin-
10 8 Class B Units on or about November 3, 2004; (c) \$100,000 having been invested in the
11 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about August 6, 2005; (d)
12 \$100,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures
13 on or about October 30, 2005; (e) \$200,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C
14 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about December 29, 2005; (f) \$50,000 having
15 been invested in Series A Preferred Stock on or about December 19, 2006; and (g)
16 \$100,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible
17 Debentures on or about February 16, 2008. As set forth more fully below, said
18 investments, except for investments in Series A Preferred Stock and the 2007 Series C
19 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, were automatically converted into Common
20 Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.

21
22 65. Plaintiffs Gary Meyer and Deborah Meyer are Arizona residents. Plaintiffs
23 invested a total of \$305,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$125,000 having been invested in
24 the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with corresponding units held by
25

1 Entrust Administration FBO Gary W. Meyer IRA #28467 on or about December 28, 2005;
 2 (b) \$80,000 having been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
 3 Debentures, with corresponding units held by Entrust Administration FBO Deborah L.
 4 Meyer IRA #29230 on or about May 22, 2006; and (c) \$100,000 having been invested in
 5 the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with corresponding units held by
 6 Plaintiffs Gary Meyer and Deborah Meyer on or about June 22, 2006. As set forth more
 7
 8 fully below, said investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the
 9 Company on or about January 8, 2007.

11
 12 66. Plaintiff V. Jerome Mirkil, M.D. is a Nevada resident. Plaintiff invested a
 13 total of \$50,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series
 14 C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about July 15, 2008.

15
 16 67. Plaintiff Julie Ann Monson is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total
 17 of \$100,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2005 Series C
 18 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about August 6, 2005. As set forth more fully
 19 below, said investments were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company
 20 on or about January 8, 2007.

22 68. Plaintiff Arnold H. Moschin is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total
 23 of \$75,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C
 24 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with corresponding units held by the Arnold
 25 H. Moschin IRA, on or about April 3, 2008.

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1 69. Plaintiff George O'Connor is a Massachusetts resident. Plaintiff invested a
2 total of \$50,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in Series A
3 Preferred Stock on or about January 12, 2007.
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5 70. Plaintiff Ralph A. Sturges & Co., LLC, appearing through George O'Connor,
6 is a Texas limited liability company. Plaintiff invested a total of \$25,000 in the Company,
7 with said amount having been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
8 Debentures on or about June 9, 2006. As set forth more fully below, said investments were
9 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company January 8, 2007.
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11 71. Plaintiff Rick "Maurice" O'Connor is a Florida resident. Plaintiff, acting on
12 behalf of the Irrevocable Trust of Coral B. Clifford, of which Plaintiff Rick "Maurice"
13 O'Connor is trustee, invested a total of \$90,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$25,000 having
14 been invested in the Class B Preferred Units on or about August 14, 2004; (b) \$40,000
15 having been invested in Series A Preferred Stock on or about May 21, 2007; and (c)
16 \$25,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible
17 Debentures on or about July 23, 2008. As set forth more fully below, investments in the
18 Class B Preferred Units automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or
19 about January 8, 2007.
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21 72. Plaintiff Ralph S. O'Connor is a Texas resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
22 \$353,350 in the Company, with: (a) \$45,000 having been invested in Common Units on or
23 about November 11, 2003; (b) \$55,600 having been invested in the Class B Preferred Units
24 on or about May 5, 2004; (c) \$100,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series C
25 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about July 1, 2005; (d) \$100,000 having been
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1 invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about June 9,
2 2006; and (e) \$52,750 having been invested in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
3 Debentures on or about April 1, 2009. As set forth more fully below, said investments,
4 except for the investment in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, were
5 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
6

7
8 73. Plaintiffs Rafael and Rose Penunuri are California residents. Plaintiffs
9 invested a total of \$100,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the
10 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about January 28, 2008.
11

12 74. Plaintiff Dean P. Phypers is a Florida resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
13 \$265,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$165,000 having been invested in Class A Preferred
14 Units on or about August 31, 2003; and (b) \$100,000 having been invested in the 2007
15 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about October 15, 2008. As
16 set forth more fully below, the investment in the Class A Preferred Units automatically
17 converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
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19
20 75. Plaintiff Phypers Investment Co., LLC, appearing through its principal Dean
21 P. Phypers, is a Virginia limited liability company. Plaintiff invested a total of \$100,000 in
22 the Company, with said amount having been invested in Class A Preferred Units on or
23 about December 15, 2005. As set forth more fully below, said investment automatically
24 converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
25

26 76. Plaintiff Brenda Ringwald is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
27 \$50,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2005 Series C
28 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about October 19, 2005. As set forth more

1 fully below, said investment automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company
2 on or about January 8, 2007.

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4 77. Plaintiff Wayne Rish is a Texas resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
5 \$125,524 in the Company, with: (a) \$24,500 having been invested in Class B Preferred
6 Units, with the corresponding number of units held in the Nelson Wayne Rish IRA, of
7 which Plaintiff Wayne Rish is beneficiary, on or about February 14, 2005; (b) \$25,000
8 having been invested in the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the
9 corresponding number of units held in the Nelson Wayne Rish IRA, of which Plaintiff
10 Wayne Rish is beneficiary, on or about April 27, 2006; (c) \$50,000 having been invested in
11 the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of
12 units held in the Nelson Wayne Rish IRA, of which Plaintiff Wayne Rish is beneficiary, on
13 or about September 21, 2006; and (d) \$26,024 having been invested in Series A Preferred
14 Stock, with the corresponding number of shares held in the Nelson Wayne Rish IRA, of
15 which Plaintiff Wayne Rish is beneficiary, on or about January 3, 2007. As set forth more
16 fully below, said investments in the Class B Preferred Units, 2005 Series C Subordinated
17 Convertible Debentures, and 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures were
18 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.

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23 78. Plaintiff Bougainvillea Investments, LP, appearing through its principal
24 Plaintiff Wayne Rish, is an Arizona limited partnership. Plaintiff invested a total of
25 \$75,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$50,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred
26 Stock on or about April 16, 2007; and (b) \$25,000 having been invested in Common Stock
27 in the Company on or about February 5, 2008.
28

1 79. Plaintiff Manny Roohanipur, M.D. is a California resident. Plaintiff invested
2 a total of \$340,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$100,000 having been invested in the 2005
3 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures by Plaintiff Manny Roohanipur, M.D., on
4 behalf of the M. Roohanipur M.D. Pension Trust, of which Plaintiff is trustee, on or about
5 October 19, 2005; (b) \$100,000 having been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated
6 Convertible Debentures by Plaintiff Manny Roohanipur, M.D., on behalf of the M.
7 Roohanipur M.D. Pension Trust, of which Plaintiff is trustee, on or about June 27, 2006;
8 (c) \$100,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred Stock by Plaintiff Manny
9 Roohanipur, M.D., on behalf of the M. Roohanipur M.D. Pension Trust, of which Plaintiff
10 is trustee, on or about April 11, 2007; and (d) \$40,000 having been invested in the 2006
11 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures by Plaintiff Manny Roohanipur, M.D., on
12 behalf of the Sean Armani Roohanipur Age 21 Trust, of which Plaintiff is trustee, on or
13 about October 18, 2006. As set forth more fully below, investments in the 2005 Series C
14 Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
15 Debentures automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about
16 January 8, 2007.

22 80. Plaintiff Manny and Doreen Roohanipur Private Foundation, Inc., appearing
23 through its president Manny Roohanipur, M.D., is a California non-profit foundation.
24 Plaintiff invested a total of \$100,000 in the Company, with said amount having been
25 invested in the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures, on or about December
26 6, 2005. As set forth more fully below, investments in the 2005 Series C Subordinated
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1 Convertible Debentures and 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures
2 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.

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4 81. Plaintiff Roohanipur Family Limited Partnership, appearing through its
5 partner Manny Roohanipur, M.D., is a Nevada domestic limited partnership. Plaintiff
6 invested a total of \$500,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$100,000 having been invested in
7 the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about October 28, 2005; (b)
8 \$100,000 having been invested in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures
9 on or about June 27, 2006; (c) \$100,000 having been invested in Common Stock on or
10 about November 2, 2007; (d) \$100,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred Stock
11 on or about April 11, 2007; and (e) \$100,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred
12 Stock on or about November 2, 2007. As set forth more fully below, investments in the
13 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2006 Series D Subordinated
14 Convertible Debentures automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or
15 about January 8, 2007.
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20 82. Plaintiff Stephen Ross is an Oklahoma resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
21 \$150,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C
22 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about January 28, 2008.

23
24 83. Plaintiff E. Peter Ruddy is a Florida resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
25 \$55,600 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the Class B Preferred
26 Units on or about November 1, 2004. As set forth more fully below, said investment
27 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
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1 84. Plaintiffs Donald E. Rutten and Irene G. Rutten, are Illinois residents.
2 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$100,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$50,000 having been
3 invested in the 2007 Series A Subordinated Debentures, with the corresponding number of
4 units held in the Donald E. Rutten Revocable Trust, of which Plaintiff Donald E. Rutten is
5 trustee, on or about June 22, 2007; and (b) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series
6 A Subordinated Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held in the Donald E.
7 Rutten Revocable Trust, of which Plaintiff Irene G. Rutten is trustee, on or about June 22,
8 2007.
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11 85. Plaintiffs Garen D. Sailors and Janice E. Sailors are Arizona residents.
12 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$231,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$40,000 having been
13 invested by Plaintiff Garen D. Sailors through First Trust Company of Onaga FBO Garen
14 D. Sailors in the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about
15 November 4, 2005; (b) \$13,000 having been invested by Plaintiff Garen D. Sailors through
16 First Trust Company of Onaga FBO Garen D. Sailors in the 2006 Series D Subordinated
17 Convertible Debentures on or about September 10, 2006; (c) \$143,000 having been
18 invested by Plaintiff Janice E. Sailors through First Trust Company of Onaga FBO Janice
19 E. Sailors in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about
20 September 10, 2006; and (d) \$35,000 having been invested by Garen D. Sailors and Janice
21 E. Sailors in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the
22 corresponding number of units held in the Sailors Family Trust, of which Plaintiffs Garen
23 D. Sailors and Janice E. Sailors are trustees, on or about September 10, 2006. As set forth
24
25
26
27
28

1 more fully below, said investment automatically converted into Common Stock in the
2 Company on or about January 8, 2007.

3
4 86. Plaintiff Hugo Santibanez is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
5 \$200,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in Class A Preferred
6 Units in or about 2003 and 2004. As set forth more fully below, said investment
7 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
8

9 87. Plaintiffs Donald F. Savage and Kathleen R. Savage are New York residents.
10 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$50,000 in the Company, with said amount having been
11 invested in the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about
12 June 24, 2008.

13
14 88. Plaintiffs Gerald J. Schlaf and Kathleen Schlaf are Michigan residents.
15 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$88,100 in the Company, with: (a) \$38,100 having been
16 invested in Series A Preferred Stock by Plaintiffs Gerald J. Schlaf and Kathleen Schlaf,
17 with the corresponding number of units held in the Gerald J. Schlaf Living Trust, of which
18 Plaintiff Gerald J. Schlaf is trustor, on or about May 11, 2007; and (b) \$50,000 having been
19 invested in the 2007 Series A Subordinated Debentures by Plaintiff Gerald J. Schlaf, with
20 the corresponding number of units held in an IRA, of which the Gerald J. Schlaf Living
21 Trust is beneficiary, with Plaintiff Gerald J. Schlaf as trustee of the Gerald J. Schlaf Living
22 Trust, on or about June 26, 2007. As set forth more fully below, the investment in the 2007
23 Series A Subordinated Debentures was converted into the 2007 Series C Senior
24 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about November 8, 2007.
25
26
27
28

1 89. Plaintiff Don Schneeberger is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total
2 of \$300,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2006 Series D
3 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about June 23, 2006; (b) \$200,000 having been
4 invested in the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about
5 May 1, 2008; and (c) \$50,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series C Senior
6 Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about May 3, 2008. As set forth more fully
7 below, investment in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures
8 automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.
9

10
11 90. Plaintiff Frank W. Sciacca and Karen L. Sciacca are New Mexico residents.
12 Plaintiffs invested a total of \$50,000 in the Company, with said amount having been
13 invested in Series A Preferred Stock on or about February 2, 2007.
14

15 91. Plaintiff Marvin Silvey, M.D., is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a
16 total of \$581,400 in the Company, with: (a) \$155,700 having been invested in Common
17 Units on or about November 15, 2004; (b) \$200,700 having been invested in Common
18 Units on or about February 11, 2005; (c) \$125,000 having been invested in the 2005 Series
19 C Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about August 11, 2005; and (d) \$100,000
20 having been invested in Series A Preferred Stock on or about March 13, 2007. As set forth
21 more fully below, said investments, except for the investment in Series A Preferred Stock,
22 were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8,
23 2007.
24

25 92. Plaintiff Douglas R. Smith is a Michigan resident. Plaintiff invested a total
26 of \$75,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$50,000 having been invested in the Series A
27
28

1 Preferred Stock, with the corresponding number of shares held in IRA FBO Douglas R.
2 Smith, on or about April 5, 2007; and (b) \$25,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series
3 A Subordinated Debentures on or about July 19, 2007 and subsequently converted into the
4 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debenture in or around March 2008, with
5 the corresponding number of units held in IRA FBO Douglas R. Smith.
6

7
8 93. Plaintiff Vincent Spica is a Michigan resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
9 \$75,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$25,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred
10 Stock, with the corresponding number of shares held in the Vincent Spica Living Trust, of
11 which Plaintiff Vincent Spica is grantor and initial trustee, on or about June 22, 2007; (b)
12 \$25,000 having been invested in Series A Preferred Stock, with the corresponding number
13 of shares held in IRA FBO Vincent P. Spica, of which Plaintiff Vincent Spica is
14 beneficiary, on or about July 11, 2007; (c) \$25,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series
15 C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of units
16 held in the IRA FBO Vincent P. Spica, of which Plaintiff Vincent Spica is beneficiary, on
17 or about February 8, 2008; and (d) \$47,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series C
18 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of units held
19 in the IRA FBO Karrie Spica, on or about February 18, 2008.
20
21

22
23 94. Plaintiff Rosemarie Staebell is an Iowa resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
24 \$25,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series B
25 Subordinated Debentures with the corresponding number of shares held in the John B. &
26 Rosemarie Staebell Trust, of which Plaintiff Rosemarie Staebell is sole trustee, on or about
27 September 28, 2008.
28

1 95. Plaintiff Lisa J. Stimmel, D.D.S., is a Colorado resident. Plaintiff invested a
2 total of \$100,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007
3 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about March 19, 2008.

4
5 96. Plaintiff Hubertus J. H. Sweering is a citizen of the Netherlands. Plaintiff
6 invested a total of \$100,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the
7 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about April 11, 2008.

8
9 97. Plaintiff Ronald D. Tucker is an Arizona resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
10 \$50,000 in the Company, with: (a) \$25,000 having been invested in Domin-8 Class B
11 Units on or about June 1, 2005; and (b) \$25,000 having been invested in the 2007 Series C
12 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about May 2, 2008. As set forth more
13 fully below, investment in Domin-8 Class B Units were automatically converted into
14 Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8, 2007.

15
16
17 98. Plaintiff Charles Warner is an Iowa resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
18 \$21,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series B
19 Subordinated Debentures on or about July 9, 2007.

20
21 99. Plaintiff Jack W. Wiley is an Indiana resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
22 \$250,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C
23 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about January 17, 2008.

24
25 100. Plaintiffs Deborah L. Wilson, M.D., and Vinicio Lluberes, M.D., are Arizona
26 residents. Plaintiffs invested a total of \$207,600 in the Company, with: (a) \$57,600 having
27 been invested by Plaintiffs Deborah L. Wilson, M.D., and Vinicio Lluberes, M.D. in the
28 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures on or about November 30, 2005; (b)

1 \$50,000 having been invested by Plaintiffs Deborah L. Wilson, M.D., in the 2006 Series D
2 Subordinated Convertible Debentures, with the corresponding number of shares held in an
3 account maintained by First Trust Company of Onaga, of which Plaintiffs are beneficiaries,
4 on or about June 30, 2006; and (c) \$100,000 having been invested by Plaintiffs Deborah L.
5 Wilson, M.D., and Vinicio Lluberes, M.D., in the 2007 Series A Subordinated Debentures
6 on or about March 7, 2007. As set forth more fully below, investments in the 2005 Series
7 C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
8 Debentures were automatically converted into Common Stock in the company on or about
9 January 8, 2007.
10
11

12
13 101. Plaintiff David Zinn, M.D. is an Alabama resident. Plaintiff invested a total
14 of \$150,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in the 2007 Series C
15 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures in or about February 2008.
16

17 102. Plaintiff Mark A. Zivin is an Illinois resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
18 \$32,600 in the Company, with: (a) \$7,600 having been invested in Common Units on or
19 about December 2, 2003; and (b) \$25,000 having been invested in Class B Preferred Units
20 on or about July 9, 2004. As set forth more fully below, investments in Common Units and
21 Class B Preferred Units were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company
22 on or about January 8, 2007.
23
24

25 103. Plaintiff Margie M. Zivin is an Illinois resident. Plaintiff invested a total of
26 \$25,000 in the Company, with said amount having been invested in Class B Preferred
27 Units on or about December 29, 2004. As set forth more fully below, said investments
28

1 were automatically converted into Common Stock in the Company on or about January 8,
2 2007.

3
4 104. Defendant Gregory K. McGrath is an Ohio resident. At all material times,
5 Defendant was a director and officer of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which engaged
6 in purposeful activities in Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its directors
7 and officers, including Defendant.
8

9 105. Defendant John A. Ensign is an Ohio resident. At all material times,
10 Defendant was an officer of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which engaged in
11 purposeful activities in Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its directors
12 and officers, including Defendant.
13

14 106. Defendant Daniel P. Buettin is a Florida resident. At all material times,
15 Defendant was an officer of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which engaged in
16 purposeful activities in Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its directors
17 and officers, including Defendant.
18

19 107. Defendant Thomas Thistleton is an Ohio resident. At all material times,
20 Defendant was an officer of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which engaged in
21 purposeful activities in Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its directors
22 and officers, including Defendant.
23

24 108. Defendant Sean D. Curran is an Ohio resident. At all material times,
25 Defendant was a director and /or officer of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which
26 engaged in purposeful activities in Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its
27 directors and officers, including Defendant.
28

1 109. Defendant Charles V. Shamblee III is a North Carolina resident. At all
2 material times, Defendant was a director of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which
3 engaged in purposeful activities in Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its
4 directors and officers, including Defendant.
5

6 110. Defendant Chris A. Lewis is a Florida resident. Defendant was, during the
7 relevant period, a Board member of Defendant Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc. At all
8 material times, Defendant was a director of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which
9 engaged in purposeful activities in Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its
10 directors and officers, including Defendant.
11

12 111. Defendant Ronald J. Rapp is a Florida resident. Defendant was, during the
13 relevant period, a Board member of Defendant Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc. At all
14 material times, Defendant was a director of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which
15 engaged in purposeful activities in Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its
16 directors and officers, including Defendant.
17

18 112. Defendant Jay Hill is a Florida resident. At all material times, Defendant was
19 a director of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which engaged in purposeful activities in
20 Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its directors and officers, including
21 Defendant.
22

23 113. Defendant J. Robert Routt is an Ohio resident. At all material times,
24 Defendant was a director of Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions, Inc., which engaged in
25 purposeful activities in Arizona at the direction of and / or for the benefit of its directors
26 and officers, including Defendant.
27
28

1 114. Defendant DeWaay Financial Network, Inc., is an Iowa corporation. Upon
2 information and belief, Defendant has directly or indirectly engaged in purposeful activities
3 in Arizona in connection with the acts alleged herein.
4

5 115. Defendant DeWaay Financial Network, LLC, is an Iowa limited liability
6 company. Upon information and belief, Defendant has directly or indirectly engaged in
7 purposeful activities in Arizona in connection with the acts alleged herein.
8

9 116. Defendant DeWaay Capital Management, Inc., is an Iowa corporation. Upon
10 information and belief, Defendant has directly or indirectly engaged in purposeful activities
11 in Arizona in connection with the acts alleged herein.
12

13 117. Defendant D8 Funding I, LLLP, is an Iowa limited liability limited
14 partnership. Upon information and belief, Defendant has directly or indirectly engaged in
15 purposeful activities in Arizona in connection with the acts alleged herein.
16

17 118. Defendant D8 Funding Management, LLC, is an Iowa limited liability
18 company. Upon information and belief, Defendant has directly or indirectly engaged in
19 purposeful activities in Arizona in connection with the acts alleged herein.
20

21 119. Defendant D8 Note Purchase, LLLP, is an Iowa limited liability limited
22 partnership. Upon information and belief, Defendant has directly or indirectly engaged in
23 purposeful activities in Arizona in connection with the acts alleged herein.
24

25 120. Defendant D8 Note Purchase Management, LLC, is an Iowa limited liability
26 limited company. Upon information and belief, Defendant has directly or indirectly
27 engaged in purposeful activities in Arizona in connection with the acts alleged herein.
28

1 121. Defendant D8 Acquisition Corp. is a Delaware corporation. Defendant has
2 directly or indirectly engaged in purposeful activities in Arizona in connection with the acts
3 alleged herein.
4

5 122. Defendant Lawrence Labine is an Arizona resident. Upon information and
6 belief, at materials times related hereto, Defendant engaged in purposeful activities in
7 Arizona as an independent securities broker, either personally or on behalf of an entity. If
8 and when it is determined whether Defendant acted on behalf of an entity, as opposed to
9 personally, Plaintiffs will seek leave of the Court to amend the Complaint to set forth the
10 name of said entity.
11

12 123. Defendants John and Jane Does I–X, ABC Corporations I–X, and XYZ
13 Partnerships I–X are individuals, corporations, or partnerships, respectively, or other
14 incorporated or unincorporated associations, whose true names are presently unknown to
15 Plaintiffs, but who are or may be liable to Plaintiffs on their Complaint. If and when the
16 true names of such fictitious defendants become known, Plaintiffs will seek leave of the
17 Court to amend the Complaint to set forth their true names, capacities, and relationships.
18
19
20

21 **GENERAL ALLEGATIONS**

22 **Overview**

23 124. Domin-8 was an established enterprise software application company that
24 provided proprietary, advanced software solutions and related services to the property
25 management industry in the United States and Canada.
26

27 125. Domin-8's primary customers were multi-family residential property owners
28 and managers.

1 126. Domin-8 also provided products and services to owners and managers of
2 leased commercial and retail real estate.

3 127. Between 2002 and 2009, Domin-8 offered debt and equity securities
4 (sometimes collectively referred to as “Securities”) to the Investors and requested their
5 approval of certain actions incidental to issuing the Securities.
6

7 128. In connection with offering the Securities and obtaining the approval of
8 Investors, D8’s president, Greg McGrath, made numerous trips to Phoenix, Arizona, where
9 a large number of the Investors are concentrated.
10

11 129. Domin-8 also entered into agreements with securities brokers, including
12 Donald DeWaay on behalf of DeWaay Financial Network, Inc. and/or other DeWaay
13 entities, including DeWaay Financial Network, LLC and DeWaay Capital Management,
14 Inc. (collectively, “DeWaay Entities”), and Lawrence Labine (“Labine”) to sell the
15 Securities.
16

17 130. DeWaay and Labine were responsible for placing more than seventy percent
18 (70%) of the final debt offerings in Domin-8.
19

20 131. DeWaay and Labine received compensation in the form of warrants for
21 selling the Securities.
22

23 132. The Investors in Arizona and elsewhere invested substantial sums in the
24 Securities with the expectation of making a profit and / or receiving a return on their
25 investments.
26

27 133. The funds generated through the Securities were used to fund numerous
28 acquisitions and otherwise provide working capital for the Company.

1 134. Domin-8's overly aggressive acquisition strategy, coupled with its failure to
2 meet its projections and control costs, caused the Company to operate at a substantial loss.

3 135. Domin-8's directors and officers, including various Defendants, knew or
4 should have known that the Investors would not realize a return on their investments in the
5 Securities because the Company was operating at a substantial loss all the while continuing
6 to increase its debt.
7

8 136. Nonetheless, Domin-8's directors and officers, including various Defendants,
9 approved of the offering of the Securities and the dissemination of false and misleading
10 information regarding the same.
11

12 137. Further, Domin-8's directors and officers, including various Defendants,
13 never took any actions to correct the overly inflated financial projections that had been
14 made to the Investors in connection with the Securities.
15

16 138. Eventually, Domin-8 began to operate more profitably and was poised for
17 success as a result of the acquisition strategy that had been funded by the Investors.
18

19 139. By that time, however, it was overburdened with debt to the point that, upon
20 information and belief, it was no longer viable as a going concern.
21

22 140. Recognizing that the Company was finally in a position to begin operating
23 successfully but for its debt, Domin-8's management, who enjoyed stock options in the
24 Company, approached DeWaay and Labine about making a "stalking horse" bid for
25 Domin-8's assets if it agreed to file bankruptcy.
26

27 ...
28

1 141. After purchasing the Company, DeWaay and Labine would operate it under a
2 new name with the assistance of existing management, who were to receive favorable stock
3 options in the new company.
4

5 142. By taking over Domin-8 free and clear of this debt, Domin-8's management,
6 along with DeWaay and Labine, were positioned to continue to operate D8 successfully to
7 the exclusion of the Investors, who had financed the acquisitions and provided the working
8 capital that allowed the Company to begin operating profitably.
9

10 143. In September 2009, various Defendants approved of or participated in the
11 decision to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy on behalf of Domin-8.
12

13 144. At or around the time of the bankruptcy, DeWaay and LaBine formed various
14 entities, including D8 Funding I, LLLP, D8 Funding Management, LLC, D8 Note
15 Purchase, LLLP, D8 Note Purchase Management, LLC, and / or D8 Acquisition Corp.
16 (collectively, "D8 Entities"), for purposes of purchasing Domin-8's assets and raising
17 money from the Investors to fund the same.
18

19 145. The attempt to purchase Domin-8's assets was not successful, as one of
20 Domin-8's competitors emerged from the bankruptcy as the successful bidder.
21

22 146. The failed attempt to purchase the assets through the Sec. 363 sale was to the
23 detriment of the Investors, who have lost all or a substantial portion of their investments as
24 a result of bankruptcy.
25

26 **Formation and Early Business**

27 147. In January 2002, McGrath founded Domin-8, Inc., a Maryland corporation.
28

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1 148. McGrath founded Domin-8, Inc. with the purpose of developing and
2 marketing products and services that would improve the multi-family dwelling unit
3 industry.
4

5 149. As part of a structured conversion, Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions LLC
6 (“Domin-8 LLC”), a Maryland limited liability company, became the parent company of
7 Domin-8 Inc. (collectively, “Domin-8”) in May 2002.
8

9 150. Prior to founding Domin-8, McGrath was majority shareholder of WaKul,
10 Inc. (“WaKul”), another Maryland corporation.
11

12 151. At the time that McGrath formed Domin-8, WaKul had approximately
13 \$3,000,000 in outstanding accounts payable and no revenue to satisfy payment.
14

15 152. Like Domin-8, WaKul was established to enhance multi-family dwelling unit
16 management through technology.
17

18 153. McGrath, through WaKul, had begun to develop property management
19 software.
20

21 154. WaKul owned all rights to the software, except for the source code.

22 155. The software’s source code was owned by its developer.

23 156. The developer owned the source code because WaKul never paid for it as
24 required by the parties’ contract.

25 157. The developer subsequently obtained a judgment against WaKul in the
26 amount of \$962,000.
27

28 158. Upon formation, Domin-8 purchased all rights to the software, except for the
source code, from WaKul for \$50,000.

1 159. Domin-8 also agreed to assume the outstanding judgment against WaKul.

2 160. Domin-8 subsequently satisfied the judgment and entered into a mutual
3
4 release with the developer pursuant to which Domin-8 paid \$262,000 to the developer for
5 the rights to the source code.

6 161. After acquiring full rights to the software, Domin-8 began to market it under
7
8 the name "Paradigm."

9 162. Domin-8 marketed Paradigm to companies owning multi-family dwelling
10
11 units.

12 163. In addition to marketing Paradigm, Domin-8 offered property management
13
14 services, such as applicant screening, service activation, and collections.

15 164. Domin-8's Vice President of Operations, Tom Thistleton ("Thistleton"), was
16
17 responsible for coordinating and managing all Domin-8's operations, including
18
19 implementing, rolling out, and providing customer support for Domin-8's products and
20
21 services.

22 165. McGrath acted as Domin-8's Chief Executive Officer and was on the board
23
24 of directors.

25 166. As of March 2004, Domin-8's board of directors consisted of: (1) Greg
26
27 McGrath, who, as stated, was also Chief Executive Officer; (2) Sean D. Curran, who was
28
also Vice President Business Development/General Counsel; (3) Charles V. Shamblee III
("Shamblee"), who was an outside director; and (4) J. Robert Routt, who was also an
outside director (collectively, the "2004 Board").

1 167. These directors and officers would remain in place for approximately the
2 next two years.

3
4 168. At all material times during its existence, Domin-8's officers, including, but
5 not limited to, McGrath, would correspond with potential and existing Investors orally and
6 in writing.

7
8 169. Upon information and belief, the directors were or should have been aware of
9 these correspondences and / or approved the content of the same.

10 170. Written correspondence was sent regularly to existing Investors.

11
12 171. As explained in detail below, these written correspondences would regularly
13 make specific representations about the Company and its affairs, particularly with respect
14 to its performance and objectives.

15
16 172. Upon information and belief, Domin-8's directors and officer knew or should
17 have known that the written and oral correspondences made to the Investors about the
18 Company would influence their decision to invest in the Company.

19
20 **Initial Securities Offerings by Domin-8 LLC**

21 **Initial Equity Offerings**

22 173. According to the terms of the Operating Agreement, the initial membership
23 interests in Domin-8 were divided into common units ("Common Units") and Class A
24 Preferred Units ("Class A Preferred Units").

25
26 174. Domin-8's directors and officers indirectly held the overwhelming majority
27 of the company's equity.
28

1 175. More specifically, as of December 31, 2003, various directors and officer's
2 spouses and limited liability companies held nearly all of the outstanding Common Units
3 and Class A Preferred Units.
4

5 176. Some of these units were owned by Computron One, LLC ("Computron"), a
6 limited liability company managed by Shamblee.
7

8 177. In 2002 and 2003, Domin-8 had borrowed \$450,000 and \$50,000,
9 respectively, from Computron.
10

11 178. That debt was collateralized with a priority interest in the source code and
12 other rights to Paradigm.

13 179. In or around 2004, Domin-8 began to offer Class B Preferred Units ("Class B
14 Preferred Units").
15

16 180. Domin-8 began to offer the Class B Preferred Units because it needed
17 additional investment monies after its initial 2004 forecasts were substantially off.

18 181. Domin-8 originally forecasted losses of \$900,000 in the first quarter of 2004
19 based on selling its products and services to 750,000 multi-family dwelling units by 2007.
20

21 182. At the end of the second quarter of 2004, however, Domin-8 reforecasted
22 losses of \$3.9 M based on marketing and selling its products and services to an additional
23 1.05 M units, or total 1.8 M units, by 2007.
24

25 183. Domin-8 projected an additional investment of up to \$2 M, generated
26 through the Class B Preferred Units, to "generate additional potential recurring revenues of
27 over \$100 M"
28

1 184. In connection with offering the Class B Preferred Units, McGrath actively
2 targeted Investors in Arizona.

3 185. McGrath initially presented the offering to Investors in Arizona on
4
5 September 23, 2004.

6 186. Two other presentations to Investors in Arizona followed on October 19 and
7
8 27, 2004.

9 187. During these presentations, McGrath represented that “Domin-8 could
10 manage to a cash flow break even at 50,000 units,” but “it need[ed] the additional capital to
11 fully realize the market potential.”

12 188. The import of this representation was that the Class B Preferred Units were a
13 safe and sound investment for the Investors because Domin-8 was already positioned to be
14 at a cash flow break-even point because it had already secured sales of at least 50,000
15 units.
16

17 189. In a further attempt to entice the Investors to purchase the Class B Preferred
18 Units, McGrath said that “[t]here is a monthly financial review as part of the monthly
19 Board meeting,” and that “monthly Board meetings [would continue] until [the company]
20 is cash flow positive.”
21

22 190. McGrath also said that Thisteton’s former accounting firm, Deloitte, “will
23 review books.”
24

25 191. In fact, Deloitte would not begin to review the Company’s financials until
26 late 2007 or early 2008.
27
28

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1 192. On October 25, 2004, McGrath separately informed the Investors that, “[d]ue
2 to the identification of additional product lines as well as improved pricing, [Domin-8] now
3 estimate[d] the primary and secondary market [sales] to total \$1.852b.”
4

5 193. This was a substantial increase over the “\$750m” in combined sales initially
6 forecasted by the company.
7

8 194. Based on representations and assurances about the Company made in the
9 communications circulated to the Investors and during presentations, certain Investors in
10 Arizona and elsewhere purchased the Common Units, Class A Preferred Units, and Class B
11 Preferred Units.
12

13 Initial Debt Offerings

14 195. In addition to equity securities, Domin-8 offered debt securities.
15

16 196. Domin-8 offered the debt securities because the Company was
17 undercapitalized.

18 197. According to McGrath, the Company lost at least one potential customer
19 “due to the lack of a strong balance sheet.”
20

21 198. McGrath and the Company believed that a stronger balance sheet was
22 necessary to remain competitive and secure customers.

23 199. The debt securities would strengthen the Company’s balance sheet by
24 generating additional working capital.
25

26 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures

27 200. Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures were offered to the Investors
28 beginning in 2005 (the “2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures”).

1 201. The 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures were sold in units
2 and included warrants.

3
4 202. The 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debenture offering was
5 purportedly exempt from registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933.

6 203. McGrath, on behalf of Domin-8, presented the offering to certain Investors in
7 Arizona at a luncheon meeting on March 15, 2005.

8
9 204. During this luncheon, McGrath represented that the 2005 Series C
10 Subordinated Convertible Debentures were not susceptible to the risks commonly
11 associated with private investments.

12
13 205. In particular, McGrath represented that investments in the 2005 Series C
14 Subordinated Convertible Debenture could withstand the risks of private investment
15 because: (1) Domin-8 had an actual solution to the industry problem that it was trying to
16 solve; (2) that product worked as advertised, as evidenced by customers “actively
17 marketing for Domin-8”; (3) customers were already paying for the solution “at the highest
18 solution cost in the industry”; (4) the market as a whole accepted the solution on a large
19 scale, as evidenced by “Domin-8 having won 7 of 8 competitions”; and (5) the Company
20 already had the financial means to capitalize on the opportunities available in the
21 marketplace.
22
23
24

25 206. The import of these representations was that the 2005 Series C Subordinated
26 Convertible Debentures were a sound investment because Domin-8 was already successful
27 and would only become more successful if it had access to the additional working capital
28 that would be generated through the 2005 Series C Convertible Debentures.

1 207. McGrath projected that Domin-8 would hold a 20% market share over the
2 next four years and forecasted \$180,000,000 in revenue from the primary market alone.

3 208. McGrath also represented that the “Company structure yield[ed] 70% net
4 margin.”

5 209. Originally, Domin-8 proposed offering 20 units of the 2005 Series C
6 Subordinated Convertible Debentures at a purchase price of \$100,000 per unit for a total
7 offering of \$2,000,000.
8

9 210. However, the amount of the 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible
10 Debenture offering was subsequently increased.
11

12 211. Domin-8 ultimately offered to sell up to 50 units of the 2005 Series C
13 Subordinated Convertible Debentures at a purchase price of \$100,000 per unit for a total
14 offering of \$5,000,000.
15

16 212. The 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures matured upon the
17 earliest of: (1) 12 months after the date of issuance, unless extended; (2) a merger or
18 consolidation of Domin-8; (3) the closing of a subsequent equity offering; or (4) an event
19 of default.
20

21 213. In the event of a subsequent equity offering that yielded gross proceeds to
22 Domin-8 of at least \$7,500,000 prior to the payment and satisfaction of the 2005 Series C
23 Subordinated Convertible Debentures, each Investor could, at their sole option, convert
24 their unpaid principal and interest into equity in the Company at a price equal to 80% of the
25 equity offering.
26
27
28

1 214. The warrants received by all Investors gave them the right to purchase an
2 aggregate of 357,723 common units of Domin-8. The warrants expired seven years after
3 their date of issuance and were to be exercised at a price equal to 80% of the price of the
4 equity security sold in connection with a subsequent equity offering or for \$8.23 in the
5 event that a subsequent equity offering did not occur.

6
7 215. The 2005 Series C Subordinated Debenture offering was originally set to
8 expire by October 31, 2005.

9
10 216. As part of its efforts to sell units of the 2005 Series C Subordinated
11 Debentures before the offering expired, Domin-8, through McGrath, issued a statement
12 that “the upside is enormous,” particularly in light of the anticipated acquisition of an
13 industry competitor that would substantially increase Domin-8’s sales and market share.

14
15 217. McGrath projected that the acquisition could yield revenue of \$55,000,000
16 and a projected net of \$34,000,000 over a three-year period.

17
18 218. McGrath estimated that, “[a]t a conservative multiple of 15, value [would]
19 approach[] \$500,000,000.”

20
21 219. McGrath requested the presence of certain Investors in Arizona at a
22 presentation by McGrath on October 11, 2005, to discuss Domin-8’s business affairs and
23 the 2005 Series C Subordinated Debenture.

24
25 220. Certain Investors in Arizona were informed that the 2005 Series C
26 Subordinated Debentures would likely be the last opportunity to invest in Domin-8 because
27 the Company would be seeking outside financing in the future.
28

1 221. Certain Investors in Arizona attended McGrath's presentation on October 11,
2 2005.

3
4 222. On November 3, 2005, McGrath circulated a confidential memorandum
5 updating Domin-8's previous projections in light of three acquisitions that were expected
6 to close by the end of the year.

7
8 223. McGrath projected that the acquisitions could yield "revenue of \$95,000,000
9 and net of \$50,000,000" over a four-to-five year period.

10 224. McGrath estimated that, "[a]t a conservative multiple of 15, value [would]
11 approach[] \$1,500,000,000."

12
13 225. The projected income statement provided by McGrath further stated that the
14 net income per year would increase to \$1,256,894.00 in 2006, to \$11,554,042.00 in 2007,
15 to \$22,691,104 in 2008, and to \$41,082,084.00 in 2009.

16
17 226. Upon information and belief, these projections were known to the 2004
18 Board and disseminated by McGrath with its approval.

19
20 227. On November 17, 2005, McGrath held another presentation in Arizona that
21 was attended by certain Investors in Arizona.

22 228. Regarding the 2005 Series C Subordinated Debentures, McGrath again
23 represented that "the upside is enormous" because Domin-8 had negotiated the acquisition
24 of three competitors, which would further increase Domin-8's sales and market share.

25
26 229. Certain Investors in Arizona and elsewhere purchased the 2005 Series C
27 Subordinated Debentures.
28

230. Domin-8 eventually completed two industry acquisitions, AC Software, Inc. (“ACS”), and PMAS, LLC (“PMAS”), in 2005 for \$5,356,000 and \$1,800,000, respectively.

231. Domin-8 LLC finished 2005 with cash and other current assets of \$720,000, Revenue of \$727,000, and EBITDA of negative \$5.7 M.

232. Upon information and belief, due to lack of funds, Domin-8 extended the maturity date on the debt owed to Computron by issuing common units in the company.

2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures

233. For 2006, Domin-8 originally forecasted Revenue of \$8.12 M and EBITDA of negative \$1.25 M.

234. Based on an anticipated acquisition (“Property Boss”), however, Domin-8 revised its forecast to be EBITDA positive beginning in the 4th quarter.

235. Domin-8 forecasted being EBITDA positive even sooner if another acquisition (“AMSI”) closed as expected. This acquisition would lead to “initial annualized revenues in the \$15 M range and EBITDA in the \$3 M range.”

236. Domin-8 communicated these forecasts to the Investors.

237. On March 8, 2006, Domin-8, through McGrath, informed the Investors that the Company expected to generate “over \$7m in revenue” in 2006 based on the PMAS acquisition alone.

238. McGrath also informed the Investors that the Company would “grow revenues from the combined Domin-8/ACS business from \$2.7 M in 2005 to \$4.7 M [in 2006], prior to any additional acquisitions.”

1 239. At the same time, however, McGrath explained that the funds generated by
2 another debt offering (the “2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures”) were
3 needed to provide the capital “to make the next acquisition.”
4

5 240. More specifically, Domin-8 intended “to make several smaller acquisitions of
6 companies and next target one of [its] three largest competitors.”
7

8 241. Domin-8 expected for those transactions to be completed within one year,
9 which would “lead [the company] to a commanding market share lead.”
10

11 242. In actuality, Domin-8 never had any intention of waiting to grow revenues
12 from the first acquisition before targeting other acquisitions, which is why the Company
13 immediately needed funds from the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debenture to
14 finance the next round of acquisitions.
15

16 243. McGrath also informed the Investors that the funds from the 2006 Series D
17 Subordinated Convertible Debentures would be used to make interest payments on the
18 2005 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures.
19

20 244. The 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures were sold in units
21 and included warrants.
22

23 245. Domin-8 offered to sell up to 60 units of the 2006 Series D Subordinated
24 Convertible Debentures at a purchase price of \$100,000 per unit for a total offering of
25 \$6,000,000.
26

27 246. The 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debenture offering was
28 purportedly exempt from registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933.

1 247. The 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures matured upon the
2 earliest of: (1) 12 months after the date of issuance, unless extended; (2) a merger or
3 consolidation of Domin-8; (3) the closing of a subsequent equity offering; or (4) an event
4 of default.
5

6 248. In the event of closing a subsequent equity offering that yielded gross
7 proceeds to Domin-8 of at least \$7,500,000 prior to the payment and satisfaction of the
8 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, each Investor could, at their sole
9 option, convert their unpaid principal and interest into equity in the Company of the same
10 class at a price equal to 85% of the equity offering.
11

12 249. The warrants received by all Investors gave them the right to purchase an
13 aggregate of 217,323 common units of Domin-8. The warrants expired seven years after
14 their date of issuance and were to be exercised at a price equal to 85% of the price of the
15 equity security sold in connection with the subsequent equity offering or for \$8.34 in the
16 event that a subsequent equity offering did not occur.
17

18 250. The 2006 Series D Subordinated Debenture offering was originally set to
19 expire by June 29, 2006.
20

21 251. To entice the Investors to participate in the 2006 Series D Subordinated
22 Convertible Debenture offering, McGrath advised that Domin-8 was currently negotiating
23 with several institutional firms for an equity investment in the amount of \$18 to \$20 M.
24

25 252. The equity investment would allow the Investors to convert the 2006 Series
26 D Convertible Debentures into equity securities at favorable rates.
27
28

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1 253. On April 12, 2006, Domin-8, through McGrath, provided the Investors with
2 additional revenue projections based on two additional acquisitions that the Company had
3 negotiated.
4

5 254. McGrath informed the Investors that the acquisition of LogicBuilt SV, LLC
6 (“LogicBuilt”), would increase revenue by “\$600,000 - \$700,000 ... over the next 12
7 months.”
8

9 255. McGrath also informed the Investors that, when another negotiated
10 acquisition was completed (“Property View Solutions”), an additional “\$800,000 -
11 \$900,000 in revenue [would be generated] over the next 12 months.”
12

13 256. Combined, McGrath projected that “Domin-8 [would] have projected
14 forward 12-month revenues of \$8.4m with four-year out revenues on the 1.1m units being
15 over \$40m” and “[would] also climb into the number-four market-share position in the
16 industry.”
17

18 257. McGrath also informed the Investors that Domin-8 had initiated acquisition
19 discussions with Property Boss and AMSI, which would be acquired using the funds from
20 the anticipated equity investment.
21

22 258. Acquisition of the two companies would make “Domin-8 LLC the holder of
23 the largest market share in the industry.”
24

25 259. As Domin-8 completed acquisitions, it sought to control expenses by
26 reducing overhead where possible.
27

28 260. As of May 22, 2006, McGrath estimated that recent staff and space
reductions would save Domin-8 approximately \$72,000 annually.

1 261. At the same time, Domin-8, through McGrath, provided the Investors with an
2 updated financial forecast.

3
4 262. McGrath informed the Investors that it expected to be “EBITDA profitable in
5 the 4th quarter without additional acquisitions” based on the additional sales made
6 through ACS and PMAS.

7
8 263. Even though Domin-8 did not have the means to finance the acquisitions
9 without the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, McGrath expressed the
10 Company’s intention to continue to target numerous acquisitions over the next several
11 months.

12
13 264. McGrath also updated the prior month’s forecasts for the Investors,
14 particularly as they related to the negotiated acquisitions.

15
16 265. McGrath reiterated again that the LogicBuilt acquisition would add
17 “\$600,000 - \$700,000 in revenue over the next 12 months,” and that the Property View
18 Solutions acquisition was now expected to add “\$900,000 - \$1,000,000 in revenue over the
19 next 12 months,” rather than the “\$800,000 - \$900,000 originally expected.”

20
21 266. According to McGrath, “[u]pon the closing of these two transactions, Domin-
22 8 [would] have projected forward 12-month revenues of \$8.6m with four-year out revenues
23 on the 1.1m units being over \$40m.”

24
25 267. On June 5, 2006, Domin-8, through McGrath, informed the Investors that the
26 LogicBuilt acquisition had closed as anticipated and would “be accretive by over \$400,000
27 year one,” as opposed to the \$600,000 - \$700,000 that was projected just two months
28 earlier.

1 268. Regarding the Property Boss and AMSI acquisitions, McGrath projected first
2 year revenues of “\$1,000,000” from Property Boss and “[a]nnualized revenue [that] would
3 be over \$28,000,000 and EBITDA over \$10,000,000” from AMSI.
4

5 269. McGrath also said that, with those acquisitions, Domin-8 “would climb to
6 arguably the leading market share position.”
7

8 270. In addition to increasing revenues through the existing sales of the
9 acquisitions, Domin-8 expected to increase revenues through the sale value-added services.
10

11 271. McGrath projected that value-added services “would increase annual
12 revenues by approximately \$2,400,000 over a partial year,” as “against annual existing
13 revenues of \$3,500,000 for these assets in the same period.” This was “an increase of 68%
14 in a weighted nine month timeframe.”
15

16 272. McGrath informed the Investors that Domin-8 expected to “increase
17 annualized revenue from \$800,000 in 2005 to a current expectation of \$8,000,000.”
18

19 273. As part of its efforts to sell units of the 2006 Series D Convertible
20 Subordinated Debentures before the offering expired, Domin-8, through McGrath, issued a
21 statement on June 9, 2006, that the Company expected to close a round of equity financing
22 as contemplated by the private placement memoranda for both the 2005 Series C and 2006
23 Series D Subordinated Debentures.
24

25 274. In the statement, McGrath also said that “there w[ould] be no further
26 opportunities for individual investors to invest in the company” after the 2006 Series D
27 Subordinated Debenture offering expired because “[a]ny future capital requirements will
28 be provided by institutional investors.”

1 275. Only three days later, Domin-8, again through McGrath, informed the
2 Investors directly that the equity financing was imminent, and that “[the company] would
3 expect to never again need outside investment except for credit facilities after the [equity
4 financing] closing.”

5
6 276. McGrath’s representation was intended to induce the Investors to purchase
7 the 2006 Series D Convertible Subordinated Debentures, as evidenced by his statement that
8 “[the Company] wanted to notify you that to be certain of participating we must receive the
9 investment on or before June 29.”

10
11
12 277. On July 17, 2006, Domin-8, through McGrath, informed the Investors that
13 the 2006 Series D Convertible Subordinated Debenture offering was fully subscribed due
14 to the anticipated equity financing allowing for the AMSI acquisition.

15
16 278. McGrath, however, said that Domin-8 would over-subscribe the 2006 Series
17 D Convertible Subordinated Debenture offering to allow Investors to continue to
18 participate before the anticipated equity financing was completed.

19
20 279. McGrath also updated the Investors as to the status of the Property Boss and
21 AMSI acquisitions.

22 280. McGrath reiterated that the Property Boss acquisition, which was expected to
23 close in September, was anticipated to yield \$1 M in revenues.

24
25 281. McGrath also informed the Investors that the AMSI acquisition would not
26 close as expected because it had been acquired by another company.

27
28 282. McGrath, however, said that Domin-8 would “begin formal discussions” with
the company that had acquired it.

1 283. McGrath also informed the Investors about other anticipated acquisitions and
2 their effect on revenues.

3
4 284. McGrath said that Domin-8 was in “final negotiations” to acquire Winning
5 Edge Software, which was expected to have first year revenues of “approximately
6 \$600,000 with a significant upside potential.”

7
8 285. With respect to value-added services, McGrath said that Domin-8 was
9 exceeding expectations.

10 286. According to McGrath, value-added services would “add approximately
11 \$1,400,000 in additional revenue to the company” in the coming three months.

12
13 287. If the company was able to reach its “stretch target for year end,”
14 “\$4,000,000 in recurring revenue [would be added] to an initial base of \$4,400,000 in a
15 weighted 7 months of selling.”

16
17 288. McGrath said that “[a]nnualizing this figure suggest[ed] that [the
18 Company’s] goal of increasing revenue over 100% in the first 12 months of operations of
19 an acquired company [would be] highly achievable and [would] most likely be exceeded.”

20
21 289. Finally, McGrath informed the Investors that Domin-8 had further reduced
22 the staff of the companies that it acquired, resulting in a total recurring savings in the
23 second quarter in the amount of \$650,000 annually.

24
25 290. On August 14, 2006, Domin-8, through McGrath, informed the Investors that
26 the Company had increased its “stretch target” for value-added services, which could result
27 in “\$4,500,000 in recurring revenue [being added] to an initial base of \$4,400,000 in a
28 weighted 7 months of selling.”

1 291. McGrath also reiterated again that the Property Boss and AMSI acquisitions
2 would yield an additional \$1 M and \$7 M in revenues, respectively.

3
4 292. On August 14, 2006, McGrath informed the Investors that Domin-8 had
5 signed a term sheet with an institutional investor to provide the equity financing that would
6 be used for the acquisitions.

7
8 293. McGrath represented that the equity investment was expected to close in 60
9 days, and that additional documentation would be sent to the Investors over the course of
10 the next 45 days.

11
12 294. McGrath also identified another acquisition, Rent Right, which he forecasted
13 to generate “approximately \$1,200,000 with a significant upside potential.”

14 295. McGrath informed the Investors that Domin-8 had reduced its operating
15 expenses, which was expected to “lead to savings in 2007 of over \$750,000.”

16
17 296. Pending closing, Domin-8, through McGrath, continued to solicit Investors to
18 participate in the 2006 Series D Convertible Subordinated Debenture offering.

19
20 297. The Investors were again informed that they would only have one more
21 opportunity to invest in Domin-8 before the equity financing was used to complete the next
22 four acquisitions.

23
24 298. On September 7, 2006, McGrath held another presentation in Phoenix with
25 certain Investors in Arizona.

26 299. To encourage the Investors to participate in the 2006 Series D Convertible
27 Subordinated Debenture offering, Investors invited to the presentation were told that
28

1 Domin-8 was positioning itself to go public, or, alternatively, to be purchased by another
2 company.

3
4 300. In either event, the Investors would likely benefit from being able to convert
5 the debentures and / or exercising the warrants.

6
7 301. To reinforce the notion that Domin-8 was going to be poised to go public, the
8 Investors were also given Domin-8's projected income statements based on anticipated
9 acquisitions.

10
11 302. The projected income statements reflected positively on the financial state of
12 the Company.

13
14 303. Specifically, they reflected Domin-8 having its EBITDA increase from
15 negative \$2,563,260 in 2006 to \$20,863,669 in 2007, to \$45,342,444 in 2008, to
16 \$69,301,891 in 2009, to \$98,751,566 in 2010.

17
18 304. Domin-8 gave these aggressive EBITDA projections to the Investors even
19 though its 2006 projections were approximately \$5.5 M less than projected just one year
20 earlier.

21
22 305. Throughout the remainder of 2006, Domin-8, through McGrath, continued to
23 tout the projected revenues of its anticipated acquisitions.

24
25 306. On September 18, 2006, McGrath informed the Investors that Winning Edge
26 had more sales than the Company originally expected.

27
28 307. McGrath again projected first year revenues for Winning Edge in an amount
of "\$600,000 with a significant upside potential."

1 308. The Winning Edge acquisition was expected “to close at the end of
2 November, tied to [the] equity financing.”

3
4 309. McGrath also identified another acquisition, TCG Technologies, which he
5 projected would generate “approximately \$4,000,000 with a significant upside potential.”

6 310. McGrath informed the Investors that “the negotiations resulted in further
7 savings that [would] double [the \$750,000 reduction in costs] over the next 24 months
8 based upon forecast volume.”

9
10 311. Certain Investors in Arizona and elsewhere purchased the 2006 Series D
11 Subordinated Debentures based on Domin-8 projections and representations.

12
13 312. Although Domin-8 largely based its projections on the acquisitions, only one
14 acquisition was actually completed in 2006.

15 313. Domin-8 acquired LogicBuilt on May 31, 2006, for 88,365 common units of
16 Domin-8, which were valued at \$44,182.

17
18 314. Domin-8 ultimately did not acquire the other companies in 2006 that it had
19 informed the Investors would increase the Company’s revenues as projected.

20
21 315. As of November 2006, the 2004 Board remained in place, except that Ralph
22 Clark had replaced J. Robert Routt earlier in the year (the “2006 Board”).

23 316. Upon information and belief, the 2004 and 2006 Boards were aware of and /
24 or approved of the financial projections made by McGrath to the Investors throughout 2004
25 and 2006.

26
27 317. Upon information and belief, the 2004 and 2006 Boards were aware of and /
28 or approved of the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debenture offering.

1 318. During a presentation held by McGrath in Arizona in November 2006,
2 certain Investors were provided with materials providing that Domin-8's customer base
3 consisted of "850,000 residential apartments."
4

5 319. This number was approximately 1 M units less than the original unit
6 projections originally re-forecasted by the company in 2004 and well in excess of the
7 50,000 units that McGrath had originally represented was the threshold for the Company
8 operating at a cash flow break even point in the same year.
9

10 320. In addition, projections for gross profits continued to be aggressive, even
11 though the Company was falling far short of its gross profit projections from just one year
12 earlier.
13

14 321. Specifically, in September 2006, the company projected gross profits of
15 approximately \$3 M for 2006.
16

17 322. This is substantially below the nearly \$10 M in gross profits projected for
18 2006 by the Company back in 2005.
19

20 323. Regardless, the Company continued to project exponential growth for the
21 years that followed.
22

23 324. For example, whereas the Company just one year earlier projected gross
24 profits of approximately \$88 M in 2009, it now projected gross profits of \$118.5 M in
25 2009.
26

27 ...

28 ...

...

**Conversion of All Initial Securities Offerings
Into Common Stock in Domin-8**

325. While Domin-8 was continuing to over-subscribe the 2006 Series D Convertible Subordinated Debentures, it decided to seek equity financing from a different institutional investor.

326. On September 18, 2006, McGrath informed the Investors that GunnAllen Financial, Inc. (“GunnAllen”), would be the institutional investor that would provide the equity financing.

327. Domin-8 purportedly sought equity financing from GunnAllen because it “result[ed] in existing investors owning 42% more of Domin-8 than [sic] [they] would have in the [other] transaction.”

328. McGrath stated that the Company was assigned a \$38.2 M pre-money valuation.

329. McGrath also stated that the Company “[was] able to negotiate keeping a 60% majority on the Board and maintaining [its] LLC status until it [would be] required for an IPO, if [the Company] determine[d] that [was] the best exist strategy for the company.”

330. Only a month-and-a-half after informing the Investors that the Company would maintain its LLC status, McGrath informed the Investors that the Company had to convert into a C-Corporation and convert all outstanding securities into common stock (“Common Stock”) in the C-corporation as part of the GunnAllen investment (the “Exchange Offer”).

...

1 331. McGrath also informed the Investors that the pre-money valuation was now
2 “almost \$48 M,” instead of \$38.2 M.

3
4 332. Upon information and belief, these statements were approved of and / or
5 known to the 2006 Board and disseminated by McGrath with its approval.

6 333. The Exchange Offer, which required the approval of the Investors, had to be
7 completed by November 15, 2006.

8
9 334. On November 1, 2006, Domin-8, through McGrath, provided the Investors
10 with additional information regarding the equity financing from GunnAllen.

11
12 335. McGrath recommended that the Investors approve the Exchange Offer
13 because Domin-8 would “have to significantly reorganize ... solely to survive” if it did not
14 receive additional capital through the equity financing from GunnAllen.

15
16 336. Despite supposedly needing the additional capital just “to survive,” McGrath
17 informed the Investors that it intended to use the additional capital to acquire even more
18 competitors.

19
20 337. According to McGrath, the additional capital would be used “to grow the
21 Company beyond what [the] most aggressive projections from last year suggested.”

22 338. McGrath also said that the additional capital would “allow [Domin-8] to
23 become the leading company in the property management software industry, as [it]
24 expect[ed] to close the scheduled acquisitions over the next 90 days.”

25
26 339. Upon information and belief, these statements were also approved of and / or
27 known to the 2006 Board and disseminated by McGrath with its approval.

28 340. The Exchange Offer was subsequently completed successfully.

1 341. After the Exchange Offer was completed, Domin-8 became a Delaware
2 corporation.

3 342. As contemplated by the Exchange Offer, the Investors in Domin-8 tendered
4 their respective unit ownership interests for shares of Common Stock.
5

6 343. Investors who held warrants for unit interests in Domin-8 as a result of
7 having invested in the 2005 Series C and 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
8 Debentures also exchanged their respective warrant interests for warrants to purchase
9 Common Stock.
10

11 344. Upon completion of the Exchange Offer, the aggregate number of warrants
12 issued in connection with the 2005 Series C and 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
13 Debentures were increased to 446,860 and 255,556, respectively. The exercise price was
14 adjusted to \$3.05 and \$3.21 per share in accordance with their terms, again respectively.
15

16 345. Certain Investors in Arizona and elsewhere had their equity and debt
17 securities in Domin-8 converted into Common Stock.
18

19
20 **Subsequent Securities Offerings By Domin-8**

21 **Equity Offerings**

22 346. As part of the Exchange Offer, Domin-8 offered new securities to the
23 Investors in the form of Series A Preferred Stock (the "Series A Preferred Stock") and
24 Common Stock.
25

26 347. The Series A Preferred Stock ranked senior to all classes of Common Stock,
27 but voted together as a single class.
28

1 348. Holders of the Series A Preferred Stock were entitled to cast the number of
2 votes equal to the number of shares of Common Stock that were issuable upon conversion.

3
4 349. Upon conversion, each share of the Series A Preferred Stock was converted
5 into the number of shares of Common Stock equal to the original issue price of shares of
6 Series A Preferred Stock, plus any accrued dividend as of the time of conversion, divided
7 by the conversion price described in the Certificate of Incorporation.

8
9 350. Holders of the Series A Preferred Stock also were entitled to elect a director
10 to the board of the Company, making the total number of directors five instead of four.

11
12 351. In the event that the Company issued a certain number of shares of Series A
13 Preferred Stock, holders of those shares were entitled to elect an additional director,
14 increasing the total number of directors to six.

15
16 352. As of January 9, 2007, GunnAllen estimated that over 75% of the Series A
17 Preferred Stock offering had been subscribed, with a full subscription expected by the end
18 of the month.

19
20 353. At or around the same time that the company was actively subscribing the
21 Series A Preferred Stock offering, McGrath informed the Investors that the Company
22 “successfully closed on the first \$25M of the GunnAllen financing.”

23
24 354. By the end of April 2007, the Series A Preferred Stock offering in the amount
25 of \$20,000,000 was expected to be oversubscribed by a full 30%.

26
27 355. Based on the representations and assurances about the Company made in the
28 communications circulated to the Investors and during presentations, certain Investors in
Arizona and elsewhere purchased the Series A Preferred Stock, as well as Common Stock.

1 356. Holders of the Series A Preferred Stock elected Chris Lewis as a director on
2 the Board.

3
4 357. All other directors from the 2006 Board remained (collectively, with Chris
5 Lewis, the “2007 Board”).

6 358. Although McGrath had previously informed the Investors that the
7 institutional investment from GunnAllen would be used to fund future acquisitions, funds
8 generated through the Series A Preferred Stock offering were also being used to fund the
9 acquisitions.
10

11
12 359. Upon information and belief, funds generated from the sale of Common
13 Stock were also being used to pursue additional acquisitions.

14 360. At the time, however, Domin-8 already had substantial debt from previous
15 acquisitions.
16

17 361. Subsequent to December 31, 2006, Domin-8 had to renegotiate the original
18 promissory notes for the initial acquisition it made in 2005, which was purchased for
19 \$4,820,000 in promissory notes and \$536,000 in cash.
20

21 362. Domin-8 had to renegotiate these notes, even though the funds generated
22 from the 2005 Series C and 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures were
23 supposed to finance this and the other acquisitions that the Company had made.
24

25 363. The funds generated from the 2005 Series C and 2006 Series D Subordinated
26 Convertible Debentures alone greatly exceeded the cost of the three acquisitions that
27 Domin-8 had completed through December 31, 2006.
28

1 364. When Domin-8 Enterprise, Inc. decided to use the funds generated from the
2 institutional investment and the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock to pursue
3 additional acquisitions, it knew or should have known that it was already overburdened
4 with debt and operating at a loss.
5

6 365. Upon information and belief, the 2006 Board was or should have been aware
7 and / or approved of the use of the funds in the prescribed manner.
8

9 Debt Offerings

10 *2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures*

11
12 366. As of January 2007, Domin-8 already held the second largest market share of
13 software providers to the apartment industry.

14 367. Although Domin-8 knew or should have known that it was already
15 overburdened with debt and operating at a substantial loss, it continued to pursue industry
16 acquisitions aggressively.
17

18 368. Domin-8 completed the Winning Edge and Rent Right acquisitions in early
19 2007.
20

21 369. On January 9, 2007, Domin-8, through McGrath, informed the Investors that
22 the value-added services that the Company expected to sell to Winning Edge and Rent
23 Right customers would generate “over \$50,000,000 in five years.”
24

25 370. McGrath also stated that the Winning Edge and Rent Right acquisitions
26 would “[a]dd additional revenue of an initial \$1,100,000 and a forecast [of] \$2,500,000+
27 for 2007” and “[p]rovide an expected \$1,200,000 Ebitda contribution to Domin-8 in 2007.”
28

1 371. Another acquisition, Property Automation, was also expected after the
2 second 25% of the institutional financing from GunnAllen closed.

3
4 372. On January 9, 2007, Domin-8, through McGrath, informed the Investors that
5 “[u]pon receipt of the final 50% of the funds [the Company] [would] make the final
6 acquisitions contemplated with the financing.”

7
8 373. Despite informing the Investors only four months earlier that the institutional
9 financing would be used “to grow the Company,” Domin-8 ultimately did not have the
10 financial resources to complete the acquisitions.

11
12 374. Because Domin-8 Enterprise did not have the financial resources to complete
13 the acquisitions, it, along with GunnAllen, offered a round of debentures (the “2007 Series
14 A Subordinated Debentures”).

15
16 375. In May 2007, Domin-8, through McGrath, represented to the Investors that
17 the Company “expect[ed] th[e] debt offering to go very quickly,” and that the Company
18 “prefer[red] to reward ... existing shareholders with th[e] lucrative monthly paying
19 investment”

20
21 376. Upon information and belief, Domin-8, through McGrath, also continued to
22 hold out the prospect of an IPO or buy-out to encourage Investors to participate in the
23 offering.

24
25 377. Domin-8 offered to sell 70 units of the 2007 Series A Subordinated
26 Debentures at a purchase price of \$100,000 per unit for a total offering of \$7,000,000.

27
28 378. The 2007 Series A Subordinated Debentures were redeemable in whole or in
part at the option of the Company under certain circumstances at a redemption price equal

1 to 102% through June 30, 2008, 101% through June 30, 2009, or 100% after June 30, 2009,
2 of the outstanding principal amount of the debentures, plus accrued interest thereon
3 through the date of redemption.
4

5 379. The maturity date of the 2007 Series A Subordinated Debentures was June
6 30, 2010.

7
8 380. Investors who purchased the 2007 Series A Subordinated Debentures also
9 received warrants to purchase Common Stock in Domin-8.

10 381. Each unit purchased entitled the Investor to purchase up to 1,200 shares of
11 common stock, at \$0.001 par value per share, for each year that the 2007 Series A
12 Subordinated Debenture was outstanding to a maximum of 3,600 shares. The exercise
13 price for each warrant was \$4.19 per share.
14

15 382. Another round of debentures soon followed (the “2007 Series B
16 Subordinated Debentures”).
17

18 383. Domin-8 offered to sell 50 units of the 2007 Series B Subordinated
19 Debentures at a purchase price of \$100,000 per unit for a total offering of \$5,000,000.
20

21 384. The 2007 Series B Subordinated Debentures were redeemable, in whole or in
22 part, at Domin-8’s option at any time at a redemption price equal to 100% of the
23 outstanding principal amount of the debentures, plus accrued interest thereon to the date of
24 redemption.
25

26 385. The maturity date of the 2007 Series B Subordinated Debentures was
27 December 31, 2010.
28

1 386. Like the Investors who purchased the 2007 Series A Subordinated
2 Debentures, Investors who purchased the 2007 Series B Subordinated Debentures also
3 received warrants to purchase Common Stock in Domin-8. The exercise price for each
4 warrant was \$4.61 per share.
5

6 387. Each unit purchased entitled the Investor to purchase up to 52 shares of
7 common stock, at \$0.001 par value per share, for each month that the 2007 Series B
8 Subordinated Debenture was outstanding to a maximum of 2,184 shares.
9

10 388. The 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debenture offerings were
11 purportedly exempt from registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933.
12

13 389. At or around the time that it began offering the 2007 Series A and Series B
14 Subordinated Debentures, Domin-8 approached DeWaay, a securities broker-dealer, about
15 the possibility of his clients investing in Domin-8.
16

17 390. DeWaay admittedly was intrigued by Domin-8's business plan and the
18 opportunities available in the property management software industry.
19

20 391. DeWaay signed a selling agreement with Domin-8, pursuant to which he sold
21 the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures to certain Investors.
22

23 392. As part of its own efforts to sell the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated
24 Debentures, the company, through McGrath, gave at least two separate presentations to
25 Investors in Arizona on June 6 and August 30, 2007.
26

27 393. Investors invited to the presentation were again told that Domin-8 was
28 positioning itself to go public, or, alternatively, to be purchased by another company.

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1 394. Certain Investors in Arizona attended McGrath's presentations on June 6 and
2 August 30, 2007.

3
4 395. Based on the representations and assurance about the Company made in the
5 communications circulated to the Investors and during the presentations, certain Investors
6 in Arizona and elsewhere purchased the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated
7 Debentures from Domin-8, GunnAllen, DeWaay, and other broker-dealers.
8

9 396. Domin-8 ultimately raised \$6 M and \$1.9 M in funds through the 2007 Series
10 A and Series B Subordinated Debentures, respectively.
11

12 397. Two additional acquisitions, TCG Technologies and Spectra, followed after
13 Domin-8 began offering the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures.
14

15 398. Prior to making the Spectra acquisition, the 2007 Board received a
16 confidential memorandum forecasting financial projections for the acquired company.
17

18 399. Upon information and belief, similar memoranda had been prepared and
19 circulated to the boards in connection with other acquisitions.
20

21 400. Revenues for the first six months of 2007 grew, but were still far short of
22 McGrath's inflated prior projections based on the acquisitions and sale of value-added
23 services.
24

25 401. At a board meeting in July 2007, the 2007 Board was presented with revised
26 forecasts for the Company.
27

28 402. Among other things, the revised forecasts adjusted EBITDA downward to
negative \$1,446,818 from negative \$1,291,670.

1 403. Not even one year earlier, however, the Company, through McGrath, had
2 given projections to the Investors showing EBITDA of \$20,863,669 for 2007.

3
4 404. This information did or should have been put the 2007 Board, McGrath, and
5 other officers in attendance at the meeting on notice that the Company was not performing
6 as expected, particularly in light of its aggressive acquisition strategy.

7
8 405. Nonetheless, Domin-8, through McGrath, informed the Investors on October
9 18, 2007, that revenues for the first six months were \$4.491 M, as compared to \$1.277 M
10 for the same period in 2006.

11
12 406. Upon information and belief, the Company's selective communication of this
13 information was intended to leave the Investors with the impression that the acquisition
14 strategy was working as expected when that was not actually the case.

15
16 407. To bolster this impression, McGrath also informed the Investors on October
17 18, 2007, that operating losses had supposedly improved over the same period in the prior
18 year.

19
20 408. Upon information and belief, this information was disseminated by McGrath
21 to the Investors with the knowledge and approval of the 2007 Board.

22
23 409. Only seven months later, however, the Investors would learn from McGrath
24 that unaudited revenues for 2007 were ultimately just \$9.5 M (audited revenues were
25 actually \$7.9 M), as compared to \$3.2 M for 2006, and that operating costs had grown by a
26 staggering \$5.1 M to \$11.7 M.

27
28 410. Gross profits increased minimally by approximately \$1.2 M during 2007.

1 411. This gross profit figure was less than the \$1,751,782 gross profit figure that
2 was presented to the 2007 Board during a board meeting in October 2007 (the “October
3 2007 Board Meeting”).
4

5 412. During the October 2007 Board Meeting, the 2007 Board was also presented
6 with revenue projections for 2008.
7

8 413. The projections forecasted revenues in the amount of \$25 M for 2008.

9 414. Factors besides soaring operating costs were also affecting the Company’s
10 finances.
11

12 415. In 2007, the Company repaid a note of \$50,000 that had been made by an
13 entity controlled by McGrath.
14

15 416. Upon information and belief, the \$50,000 note evidenced the Company’s
16 indebtedness to WaKul for the rights to Paradigm.
17

18 417. In 2007, the Company also repaid the outstanding debt to Shamblee’s limited
19 liability company, Computron, in full.
20

21 418. By November 2007, Ronald Rapp had replaced Charles V. Shamblee III,
22 who had been serving on the 2007 Board.
23

24 419. All other directors on the 2007 Board remained in place (the “2008 Board”).

25 420. In the fall of 2007, the Company hired Daniel Buettin (“Buettin”) as Chief
26 Financial Officer and John Ensign as Chief Legal Officer.
27

28 421. According to Buettin, “one of [his] goals ... was to engage new auditors to
partner with [the company] for the years ahead and to immediately improve on the quality
of financial reporting.”

1 422. John Ensign reported directly to Buettin as Chief Legal Officer.

2 ***2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures***

3
4 423. On October 18, 2007, Domin-8, through McGrath, informed the Investors
5 that the Company was seeking outside financing in the amount of \$7 M, which would be
6 secured by senior notes (the "Senior Notes").

7
8 424. The \$7 M would be used to refinance certain promissory note obligations that
9 Domin-8 had assumed in connection with the numerous acquisitions.

10 425. McGrath also advised that yet another round of debentures would be
11 forthcoming (the "2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures").

12
13 426. Holders of the majority of the Series A Preferred Stock and the 2007 Series
14 A and Series B Subordinated Debentures had to vote to approve the Senior Notes and the
15 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

16
17 427. Holders of the majority of the Series A Preferred Stock and the 2007 Series
18 A and Series B Subordinated Debentures voted to approve the Senior Notes and the 2007
19 Series C Senior Subordinated Debentures.

20
21 428. Domin-8 offered to sell units of the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated
22 Convertible Debentures at a purchase price of \$50,000 per unit for a total offering of \$10
23 M.

24
25 429. The 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures could not be
26 pre-paid or redeemed prior to their maturity, except in connection with a "liquidity event."

27
28 430. The maturity date of the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible
Debentures was December 31, 2012.

1 431. The 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debenture offering was
2 purportedly exempt from registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933.

3
4 432. The 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures could be
5 converted into Common Stock in Domin-8 in the event of a “liquidity event,” as defined in
6 the Company’s Certificate of Incorporation.

7
8 433. Domin-8 gave holders of the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated
9 Debentures the right to convert the face value of those debentures into the 2007 Series C
10 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures in a cashless transaction.

11
12 434. Funds generated from the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible
13 Debentures were supposed to be used primarily to fund working capital needs and
14 secondarily to consummate the remaining acquisitions.

15
16 435. At the time when Domin-8 began offering the 2007 Series C Senior
17 Subordinate Convertible Debentures, however, the Company had already achieved its goal
18 of attaining the leading market share position among property management enterprise
19 software vendors serving multi-family residential property managers.

20
21 436. Despite attaining a leading market share position through the acquisitions,
22 Domin-8 was still falling far short of its forecasted projections.

23
24 437. Nonetheless, Domin-8, through McGrath, informed the Investors on
25 November 1, 2007, that “[t]he Company [was] on target in 2007 to meet its projected
26 organic growth goals.”

27
28 ...

...

1 438. Upon information and belief, this statement was inaccurate or was misleading
2 because it omitted material information with respect to the Company's growth goals based
3 on acquisitions.
4

5 439. More specifically, McGrath touted that "[t]he completion of five strategic
6 acquisitions ... resulted in an increase in the Company's user base by approximately
7 5,250,000 units," but he failed to explain to the Investors that this did not correlate with
8 increased profits for the Company, particularly in light of the soaring costs associated with
9 those acquisitions.
10

11 440. Only one month after communicating this information to the Investors,
12 Domin-8 held a board meeting (the "December 2007 Board Meeting") to discuss the state
13 of the company's business affairs, including its finances.
14

15 441. At the December 2007 Board Meeting, it was revealed that Domin-8 had
16 only closed roughly 300,000 units for its background screening services.
17

18 442. This was far less than the Company had originally projected based on the
19 acquisitions.
20

21 443. For the month of November 2007 alone, Domin-8 had fallen approximately
22 50,000 units short of its projections.
23

24 444. During that same meeting, it was also revealed that the Company's "rapid"
25 acquisition strategy was not translating into industry name recognition for the Company.
26

27 445. The acquisition strategy also was not improving the Company's overall
28 finances as had been expected and repeatedly represented to the Investors.

1 446. Whereas the Company had projected positive cash flows for 2007 just two
2 years earlier, it actually had negative cash flows in 2007.

3 447. Additionally, the Company now did not expect to be operating cash flow
4 positive until the third quarter of 2008, even though it previously informed the Investors
5 that it expected to be operating cash flow positive in 2007.

6 448. Finally, a review of the Company's finances also revealed "significant
7 cleanup of prior accounting entries" and "reconciliations in nearly all areas."

8 449. In connection with reviewing the Company's finances, the 2007 Board also
9 discussed the "[c]osts of equity and debt offerings."

10 450. The information from this meeting or other board meetings was not
11 publically disseminated to the Investors.

12 451. Upon information and belief, the 2007 Board and McGrath were aware of the
13 state of the company's finances prior to the December 2007 Board Meeting and at the time
14 when they approved and solicited investments in the Series A Preferred Stock, the 2007
15 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures, and the 2007 Series C Senior
16 Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

17 452. In fact, approximately two months before the December 2007 Board
18 Meeting, McGrath had actually informed the Investors that "[the company] believe[d] [it
19 would] achieve positive cash flow from operations within the next 9 -12 months."

20 453. Domin-8, whether through McGrath or another director or officer, did not
21 disclose the true state of Domin-8's finances to the Investors when it had asked for them to
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1 approve the Senior Notes and the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible
2 Debentures.

3
4 454. On January 30, 2008, Domin-8, through McGrath, gave a presentation to
5 Investors in Arizona to discuss Domin-8's business affairs and the 2007 Series C Senior
6 Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

7
8 455. Certain Investors in Arizona attended McGrath's presentation on January 30,
9 2008.

10 456. McGrath told the Investors invited to the presentation that Domin-8 was
11 positioning itself to go public, or, alternatively, to be purchased by another company, by
12 the end of 2009 or early 2010.

13 457. McGrath also told the Investors that, if this happened, they could expect their
14 shares of stock to rise from \$3.81 per share to \$55-\$60 per share.

15
16
17 458. This statement was recklessly calculated or intended to entice the Investors to
18 convert the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures into the 2007 Series C
19 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures and / or purchase the 2007 Series C Senior
20 Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

21
22 459. Specifically, the ability to convert the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated
23 Convertible Debentures into Common Stock would result in a windfall to the Investors,
24 who would be able to own shares of Common Stock at a fraction of the IPO price.

25
26 460. McGrath also said again that the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated
27 Convertible Debentures would be the final opportunity to invest in Domin-8 before it went
28 public or was sold to another company.

1 461. McGrath had made this same representation to the Investors on at least two
2 prior occasions in connection with other offerings.

3
4 462. Based on the representations and assurances in the communications
5 circulated to the Investors and during presentations, certain Investors in Arizona and
6 elsewhere purchased the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures from
7 Domin-8, GunnAllen, DeWaay, and other broker-dealers.

8
9 463. As of March 2008, most of the units of the 2007 Series C Senior
10 Subordinated Convertible Debentures had been sold.

11
12 464. Investors were informed that only a small number of units remained, with the
13 balance expected to be sold by the end of March 2008.

14 465. Domin-8 subsequently increased the total offering from \$10 M to \$12 M.

15
16 466. To accommodate the increased offering, the deadline for purchasing the 2007
17 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures was extended until May 30, 2008.

18 467. McGrath held another presentation to Investors in Arizona on April 30, 2008,
19 during which he discussed the 2007 Series C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

20
21 468. Domin-8 ultimately raised \$11,185,650 through the 2007 Series C Senior
22 Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

23
24 **Subordination of the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated**
25 **Debentures and 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures**

26 469. Between January 2007 and May 2008, Domin-8 Enterprise Inc. had raised
27 more than \$40 M through the debt and equity offerings (i.e., Series A Preferred Stock,
28

1 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures, and the 2007 Series C Senior
2 Subordinated Convertible Debentures).

3
4 470. Excluding the competitor that Domin-8 had previously acquired for common
5 units valued at \$44,182, however, the combined purchase price of all other acquisitions
6 was only \$12.72 M.

7
8 471. Despite Domin-8 having funds that exceeded the costs of the acquisitions
9 many times over, it never paid for the acquisitions in full.

10 472. As a consequence, Buettin had to renegotiate the promissory notes (the
11 “Seller Notes”) in 2007 and again in April 2008 when Domin-8 did not have the funds to
12 finish paying the notes.

13
14 473. As of May 2008, Domin-8 still had approximately \$7 M in outstanding
15 promissory notes in connection with the prior acquisitions.

16
17 474. Although Domin-8 had originally intended to retire this debt with the Senior
18 Notes, that financing did not come through as expected.

19
20 475. Consequently, Domin-8 purportedly had to divert funds from the 2007 Series
21 C Senior Subordinated Convertible Debentures to continue to pay the Seller Notes that it
22 was unable to retire with the \$7 M in funds from the Senior Notes.

23
24 476. In May 2008, Domin-8, through McGrath, advised that the company was
25 going to have to seek outside financing to pay the Seller Notes.

26 477. The outside financing required the Investors to subordinate each class of
27 debentures to the senior note in an amount up to \$15 M (the “Senior Note Offering”).
28

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1 478. In accordance with Domin-8's Certificate of Incorporation, McGrath
2 requested that holders of the majority of the Series A Preferred Stock and the 2007 Series
3 A and Series B Subordinated Debentures vote to approve the Senior Note Offering.
4

5 479. In addition, McGrath requested that the holders approve other measures as
6 well.
7

8 480. Holders were also asked to approve: (1) certain amendments to the
9 Certificate of Incorporation, including an amendment permitting the Company to increase
10 the authorized number of shares of Common Stock; (2) a 2007 stock option plan granting
11 certain employees and non-employees the option to purchase Common Stock; and (3) a
12 2008 equity compensation and long-term incentive plan providing for additional stock
13 options to employees and management.
14

15 481. Respectively, the holders were asked to approve these measures because: (1)
16 the authorized number of shares of Common Stock had to be increased to accommodate the
17 potential conversion of outstanding warrants, options, and convertible debentures into
18 Common Stock; (2) the Board of Directors had already approved the 2007 stock option
19 plan a year earlier in connection with the Exchange Offer and granted options pursuant to
20 the plan, but had never obtained the holders' approval; and (3) the Board of Directors had
21 granted additional stock options as an incentive to management under the 2008 plan.
22
23
24

25 482. Domin-8 informed the Investors that its actions were directed towards its
26 goal of taking the company public.
27

28 483. The majority of holders, including certain Investors, approved the Senior
Note Offering and the other measures.

1 484. In May 2008, the Company also held another board meeting (the “May 2008
2 Board Meeting”).

3 485. During the May 2008 Board Meeting, the 2008 Board discussed projected
4 revenues for 2008.
5

6 486. Projected total revenues fell approximately \$1.5 M short of those projected at
7 the December 2007 Board Meeting only five months earlier.
8

9 487. Projected total revenues for 2008 were adjusted accordingly from \$27.9 M to
10 approximately \$19.4 M.

11 488. These adjusted projected revenues were approximately \$31 M and \$62.3 M
12 less than the Company had projected in 2005 and 2006, respectively.
13

14 489. During the May 2008 Board Meeting, the 2008 Board also discussed revenue
15 projections for the acquisitions.
16

17 490. PMAS, which McGrath had previously represented was expected to generate
18 “over \$7 M in revenue” in 2006 alone, was projected to generate only \$630,951 in revenue
19 in 2008.
20

21 491. Similarly, LogicBuilt was originally projected to increase revenue by
22 “\$600,000 - \$700,000 ...,” but as of May 2008, was only projected to generate revenues of
23 \$101,040.
24

25 492. The same was also true for Winning Edge, which was expected to have first
26 year revenues of “approximately \$600,000 with a significant upside potential,” but, in fact,
27 was only expected to generate revenues of \$104,254 in 2008.
28

1 493. Upon information and belief, this was not the first time that the Company's
2 directors and officers had been presented with actual and projected revenues for the
3 acquisitions.
4

5 494. Despite knowing or should having known that the acquisitions were falling
6 far short of projections and were increasing operating costs significantly, the Company's
7 directors and officers continued to hold out the Company as a sound investment and
8 champion its future growth prospects.
9

10 495. If communicated to the Investors, this information would have affected their
11 vote to approve the measures, including the Senior Note Offering and the 2007 Series C
12 Senior Subordinated Convertible Debenture offering.
13

14 **Domin-8 Enterprise Inc.'s Finances Do Not Improve**

15 496. In mid-2008, Domin-8 began informing the Investors that "significant
16 revenue growth" was expected in the second half of 2008.
17

18 497. Domin-8 also informed the Investors that "[the Company] [would] achieve a
19 positive cash flow from ... operations on a quarterly basis by early 2009."
20

21 498. Between 2006 and 2008, however, Domin-8's revenues and profits had
22 grown substantially less than expected or even previously reported.
23

24 499. In 2006 and 2007, respectively, the Company's gross profits were negative
25 \$1.1 M and \$1.2 M according to McGrath in a communication to the Investors from May
26 13, 2008.
27

28 500. In 2005, however, the Company gave projections to the Investors showing
gross profits of roughly \$9.9 M and \$25.6 M for 2006 and 2007, respectively.

1 509. The debt offering, which was intended to provide the Company with
2 additional capital, was originally to be led by GunnAllen.

3 510. On June 30, 2008, Buettin informed the Investors that the Company's
4 financials for 2006 and 2007 had to be restated.

5 511. On August 20, 2008, Domin-8, through McGrath and Buettin, informed the
6 Investors that there would be another debt offering (the "2008 Series D Subordinated
7 Debenture").
8

9 512. The 2008 Series D Subordinated Debentures held a superior lien on
10 substantially all of the assets of the Company and its subsidiaries, subject only to the
11 Senior Note Offering.
12

13 513. To this end, the 2008 Series D Subordinated Debentures were senior to the
14 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures and the 2007 Series C Subordinated
15 Convertible Debentures.
16

17 514. Domin-8 offered to sell 240 units of the 2008 Series D Subordinated
18 Debentures at a purchase price of \$50,000 per unit for a total offering of \$12 M, with an
19 over-allotment option to sell up to an additional \$3 M in units.
20

21 515. The 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures were redeemable, in
22 whole or in part, at Domin-8's option between July 31, 2009 and July 31, 2010 at a
23 redemption price equal to 102%, between August 1, 2010 and July 31, 2011 at 101%, or
24 after August 1, 2011 at 100% of the outstanding principal amount of the 2008 Series D
25 Senior Subordinated Debentures, plus accrued interest thereon to the date of redemption.
26
27
28

 516. The maturity date of the 2008 Series D Subordinated Debenture was in 2013.

1 517. The Investors who purchased the 2008 Series D Subordinated Debenture also
2 received warrants to purchase Common Stock in Domin-8.

3
4 518. Each unit purchased initially entitled the Investor to purchase up to 857
5 shares of Common Stock, at \$0.001 par value per share at an exercise price of \$7.00 per
6 share.

7
8 519. Subsequently, Domin-8 modified the terms of the offering to entitle each
9 Investor to purchase up to 5,084 shares of Common Stock at the exercise price of \$2.95.

10 520. The maximum aggregate number of warrant shares offered was 1,220,160 at
11 the maximum offering, with an additional 305,040 warrant shares offered for the full
12 amount of the over-allotment option.

13
14 521. The 2008 Series D Subordinated Debenture offering was purportedly exempt
15 from registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933.

16
17 522. On September 26, 2008, Domin-8, through McGrath, communicated to the
18 Investors that “completing [the 2008 Series D Subordinated Debenture offering] [was]
19 essential and critical to the company and [its] ability to execute [its] business plan.”
20

21 523. McGrath also explained that the Company “[had] engaged GunnAllen
22 Financial as the lead underwriting firm, and have been joined in the selling group by
23 DeWaay Financial Network”
24

25 524. At or around this same time, the 2008 Board also began to consider the
26 possibility of filing bankruptcy.

27
28 ...

...

1 525. On October 6, 2008, Domin-8 Enterprise, Inc., through McGrath, gave a
2 presentation to Investors in Arizona to discuss Domin-8 LLC's business affairs and the
3 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
4

5 526. Certain Investors in Arizona attended McGrath's presentation on October 6,
6 2008.
7

8 527. Based on the representations and assurances made in the communications to
9 the Investors and during the presentations, certain Investors in Arizona and elsewhere
10 purchased the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures from Domin-8 Enterprise,
11 Inc., GunnAllen, DeWaay, and other broker-dealers.
12

13 **Domin-8 Files Bankruptcy and Seeks A Quick Sec. 363 Sale**

14 528. The issues with the Company's finances persisted throughout the remainder
15 of 2008 and into 2009.
16

17 529. As of the end of 2008, only \$5 M had been raised through the 2008 Series D
18 Senior Subordinated Debentures according to a communication from Buettin and
19 Thistleton to the Investors from April 3, 2009.
20

21 530. Upon information and belief, due to the lack of funds being generated
22 through the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures offering, Domin-8 undertook
23 to hire an investment banker for purposes of identifying interested private equity or venture
24 capital sources to potentially acquire the Company.
25

26 531. Upon information and belief, Domin-8 solicited and held discussions with
27 numerous investment banks over a period of ninety days.
28

1 532. Upon information and belief, all of them declined the proposed assignment
2 because they did not foresee successfully locating a buyer for the Company.

3 533. Upon information and belief, the investment banks suggested restructuring
4 Domin-8's over-weighted capital structure or filing bankruptcy as prerequisites for a
5 potential private equity investor or suitor to bid for the Company's assets.
6

7 534. Upon information and belief, the 2008 Board was or should have been aware
8 and / or approved these discussions with the investment banks.
9

10 535. At or around the same time that Domin-8 was exploring the possibility of a
11 private equity investor or suitor purchasing its assets, it was continuing to offer the 2008
12 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures to the Investors.

13 536. Upon information and belief, the 2008 Board was or should have been aware
14 of and / or approved the continued offering of the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
15 Debentures and, more specifically, was or should have been aware that representations
16 were being made to the Investors to induce them to invest in the 2008 Series D Senior
17 Subordinated Debentures.
18

19 537. Upon information and belief, the 2008 Board approved the continued
20 offering of the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures despite knowing that the
21 Company was already overleveraged with debt to the point where it was unable to attract
22 private equity investors or other potential suitors.
23

24 538. Upon information and belief, although the majority of investment banks
25 purportedly would not work with Domin-8 because it was overleveraged with debt and
26 would need to restructure or file bankruptcy before it could be acquired, one investment
27
28

1 bank with whom GunnAllen already had an existing relationship agreed to work with the
2 Company on capital restructuring, bankruptcy filing options, and seeking a potential equity
3 partner or buyer.
4

5 539. Upon information and belief, the investment bank, Hyde Park Capital
6 Partners (“Hyde Park”), analyzed Domin-8’s capital options and developed an offering
7 memorandum, which they circulated to potential capital sources around the country based
8 on their knowledge of the capital marketplace and the specific interests of the sources.
9

10 540. Upon information and belief, Domin-8 and Hyde Park contacted and
11 provided preliminary information to sixty-to-eighty interested parties.
12

13 541. While Domin-8 and Hyde Park were purportedly reaching out to parties
14 interested in investing in or acquiring Domin-8, the Company’s financial situation
15 continued to worsen.
16

17 542. By early 2009, Domin-8’s finances were in such poor condition was the
18 Company was having difficulty paying vendors.
19

20 543. On January 5, 2009, Domin-8 announced that McGrath had resigned as CEO
21 and would be replaced by Thistleton.
22

23 544. McGrath continued to serve on the board of directors, however.
24

25 545. McGrath served on the board with the rest of the 2008 Board, as well as Jay
26 Hill and Jerry Kendall, who replaced Ronald J. Rapp and Chris A Lewis as the directors
27 representing the holders of the Series A Preferred Stock (the “2009 Board”).
28

546. In February 2009, a few retail brokers, including DeWaay and Labine, who
had long been associated with the Company’s fundraising efforts, began renewed efforts to

1 energize the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures offering with other brokers
2 who had been associated with the Company and with their clients.

3
4 547. On April 3, 2009, Domin-8, through Thistleton and Buettin, informed the
5 Investors that “the brokers ha[d] received commitments for more than \$2 million in new
6 funding in 2009 and [the Company] ha[d] received approximately \$1.5 million of this new
7 funding.”

8
9 548. Thistleton and Buettin further informed the Investors that “the brokers
10 responsible for these efforts ha[d] also recently assured [the Company] that they plan to
11 continue to raise at least \$1 million per month until the Offering is fully subscribed.”

12
13 549. These funds were needed to pay the Seller Notes, which totaled \$3.6 M.

14 550. These funds were also needed to pay vendors who had not been paid and to
15 pay interest on the outstanding debentures.

16
17 551. In an effort to induce the Investors to purchase the 2008 Series D
18 Subordinated Debentures, the Company supplemented the original private placement
19 memorandum.

20
21 552. The supplement presented unaudited results of operations for the first quarter
22 and characterized them positively in light of the same figures one year earlier.

23
24 553. Overall, this supplement was misleading because, the company was on the
25 verge of bankruptcy and had been so for some time.

26 554. Upon information and belief, during a subsequent board meeting in Tampa,
27 attended by one of the Investors, Labine committed to the availability of the funds.
28

1 555. In addition, senior management of Domin-8, along with GunnAllen, held a
2 lunch meeting in Arizona with the Investors in May 2009 to discuss the Company's affairs
3 and the 2008 Series D Subordinated Debentures.
4

5 556. The meeting was attended by McGrath, Thistleton, and Buettin.

6 557. Certain Investors in Arizona attended the lunch meeting.
7

8 558. Certain Investors in Arizona and elsewhere purchased the 2008 Series D
9 Senior Subordinated Debentures from Domin-8, GunnAllen, DeWaay, and other broker-
10 dealers after attending the meeting.
11

12 559. At or around the same time that Buettin and Thistleton were touting the
13 importance of the Investors participating in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
14 Debentures, Domin-8 was still trying to locate a potential equity investor or other strategic
15 buyer.
16

17 560. In April 2009, Domin-8 and Hyde Park began to hold discussions with
18 private equity investors and strategic buyers who had received preliminary information
19 about the Company.
20

21 561. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board was or should have been aware
22 and /or approved of the ongoing attempts to locate a private equity investor and strategic
23 buyer for Domin-8 while the Company continued to offer the 2008 Series D Senior
24 Subordinated Debenture to the Investors.
25

26 562. Upon information and belief, over the following two-to-three months,
27 Domin-8 generated a substantial amount of funds through the 2008 Series D Senior
28 Subordinated Debentures.

1 563. Upon information and belief, the overwhelming majority of those
2 investments were placed by Labine as a broker- agent for DeWaay.

3
4 564. Upon information and belief, Domin-8 subsequently reduced its contract with
5 Hyde Park by 50% and ordered it to slow its efforts to locate an equity investor or strategic
6 buyer.

7
8 565. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board was or should have been aware
9 and/or approved of the reducing the contract with Hyde Park and slowing efforts to locate
10 an equity investor or strategic buyer.

11
12 566. Upon information and belief, just one month later, funding generated through
13 the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures inexplicably declined.

14 567. Upon information and belief, this caused Domin-8 to direct Hyde Park to
15 increase its efforts to locate an equity investor or strategic buyer.

16
17 568. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board was or should have been aware
18 and/or approved of Hyde Park increasing its efforts to locate an equity investor or strategic
19 buyer.

20
21 569. Upon information and belief, between the middle of July and end of August,
22 three potential buyers expressed interest in purchasing Domin-8's assets.

23
24 570. Upon information and belief, the purchase was conditioned on Domin-8
25 filing bankruptcy and allowing the buyer to purchase the assets out of the bankruptcy.

26 571. One of the potential buyers of who emerged between the middle of July and
27 the end of August was a group that would later become known as the D8 Entities.
28

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1 572. Upon information and belief, the principals of the D8 Entities were DeWaay
2 and Labine, who again had placed the vast majority of the investments in the 2008 Series D
3 Senior Subordinated Debentures and participated in previous debt and equity offerings for
4 the Company.
5

6 573. Upon information and belief, with respect to the 2008 Series D Senior
7 Subordinated Debentures alone, DeWaay and Labine placed approximately \$7.8 M, or
8 nearly two-thirds of the original allotment, in investments.
9

10 574. Upon information and belief, the D8 Entities agreed to provide debtor-in-
11 possession financing in exchange for the right to purchase Domin-8's assets out of the
12 bankruptcy.
13

14 575. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board was or should have been aware
15 and /or approved of the negotiations with D8 Entities, as well as the other buyers who
16 conditioned their investment on the Company filing bankruptcy.
17

18 576. At the time that the 2009 Board approved these negotiations, they were also
19 aware and approved of the ongoing offering of the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
20 Debentures to the Investors.
21

22 577. Upon information and belief, in or about August 2009, Buettin met with
23 Labine in California.
24

25 578. Upon information and belief, Buettin and Labine discussed Domin-8 filing
26 bankruptcy.
27

28 579. According to a September 29, 2009 letter from DeWaay, "[i]n the interest of
DeWaay's clients, [DeWaay] engaged Domin-8's new management team ... to create an

1 option in the bankruptcy process that may help preserve DeWaay's clients investments
2 while not letting them fall prey to other bidders' actions."

3
4 580. A subsequent letter from DeWaay elaborates further, going as far as to state
5 that "[a]fter it became clear Domin-8 was going to file for bankruptcy protection, Domin-
6 8's management team approached [DeWaay] about arranging a "Stalking Horse" bid in the
7 bankruptcy process to purchase the assets of Domin-8."

8
9 581. Upon information and belief, Domin-8's "new management team" included
10 Buettin and Thistleton, both whom assumed more prominent roles after McGrath's
11 resignation as Chief Executive Officer.

12
13 582. Upon information and belief, on September 16, 2009, GunnAllen broker
14 Frankie Demartini proposed a \$5.2 M funding source to Domin-8's management that was
15 comprised of investors organized by McGrath.

16
17 583. Upon information and belief, the monies from this source were ready to be
18 wired.

19
20 584. Upon information and belief, Dimartini informed Ensign that the funds were
21 available immediately.

22
23 585. Upon information and belief, Ensign informed Dimartini that this would save
24 the company.

25 586. On September 17, 2009, however, Domin-8 filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
26 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

27
28 587. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board, with the recommendation of
Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign, made the decision to file bankruptcy.

1 588. Only four days after Domin-8 filed for bankruptcy, the Company entered into
2 an asset purchase agreement (the “APA”) with one or more of the D8 Entities, which were
3 incorporated by DeWaay and / or Labine the same day.
4

5 589. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board resigned shortly after Domin-8
6 filed bankruptcy.
7

8 590. Upon information and belief, Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign were
9 responsible for making all decisions and otherwise managing the Company after the 2009
10 Board resigned.
11

12 591. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board was or should have been aware
13 and / or approved of the APA or, alternatively, “new management,” including Buettin,
14 Thistleton, and Ensign, were aware and approved of the APA.
15

16 592. Upon information and belief, if the D8 Entities’ attempt to purchase the
17 assets of Domin-8 was successful, Domin-8’s management would have received favorable
18 stock options and continued employment with the new company.
19

20 593. Only two days after entering into the APA with the D8 Entities, Domin-8’s
21 bankruptcy counsel filed a motion seeking the bankruptcy court’s approval of the sale of
22 Domin-8’s assets to D8 Funding.
23

24 594. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board was or should have been aware
25 and / or approved of bankruptcy counsel filing the motion seeking the bankruptcy court’s
26 approval of the sale of Domin-8’s assets to the D8 Entities, or, alternatively, “new
27 management,” including Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign, were aware and approved of
28

1 bankruptcy counsel filing the motion seeking the bankruptcy court's approval of the sale of
2 Domin-8's assets to the D8 Entities.

3 595. On September 24, 2009, DeWaay stated that he was "committed to
4 reinstating DeWaay investors"

5 596. To carry out protecting the "DeWaay investors," DeWaay and / or LaBine
6 formed one of the D8 Entities, D8 Acquisition Corp. ("D8 Acquisition"), a Delaware
7 corporation, on October 7, 2009.

8 597. Upon information and belief, D8 Acquisition was formed for the purpose of
9 generating the funds that the D8 Entities needed to purchase Domin-8's assets under the
10 APA.

11 598. According to a private placement memorandum, certain high-ranking
12 executives of Domin-8 would continue to be employed by one or more of the D8 Entities.

13 599. Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign were to continue to serve as officers.

14 600. In addition, Thistleton was to serve on the new board of directors.

15 601. As officers, Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign were to receive favorable stock
16 options as they had under Domin-8's existing equity compensation and long-term incentive
17 plans providing for stock options to employees and management.

18 602. Upon information and belief, Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign were all closely
19 involved with the decision to file bankruptcy and sell Domin-8's assets to the D8 Entities.

20 603. An auction for Domin-8's assets was eventually held on December 11, 2009.

21 604. At the auction, one of the D8 Entities was the prevailing bidder.

1 605. That bid, however, was subsequently challenged by RealPage, an industry
2 competitor.

3 606. RealPage subsequently purchased Domin-8's assets.

4 607. As a consequence of the calculated bankruptcy filing and failed attempt to
5 sell Domin-8's assets to D8 Funding, the Investors have lost all or a substantial portion of
6 their investments in Domin-8.
7

8 CLAIMS

9 CLAIM I

10 **Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5** 11 **of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

12 *(By Investors in 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures*
13 *and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures Against 2007,² 2008,³ and 2009⁴*
14 *Boards)*

15 608. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
16 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.
17

18 609. In connection with offering the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible
19 Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures to the Investors, the 2007,
20
21

22
23 ² For purposes of all claims in this Complaint, the Defendants from the 2007
24 Board include: (1) Greg McGrath; (2) Sean D. Curran; (3) Charles V. Shamblee III; and
25 (4) Chris Lewis.

26 ³ For purposes of all claims in this Complaint, the Defendants from the 2008
27 Board includes: (1) Greg McGrath; (2) Sean D. Curran; (3) Ronald Rapp; and (4) Chris
28 Lewis.

⁴ For purposes of all claims in this Complaint, the defendants from the 2009
Board includes: (1) Greg McGrath; (2) Sean D. Curran; and (3) Jay Hill.

1 2008, and 2009 Boards engaged in acts, practices, and / or courses of conduct that operated
2 as a fraud and deceit upon the Investors.

3
4 610. The 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards approved the offering and ongoing
5 solicitation of investments in the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and
6 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, despite knowing or should having known
7 that the Company would be unable to repay the debt because it had experienced anemic
8 growth relative to its projections over the years, had soaring expenses, and was already
9 overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions and debt offerings.
10

11
12 611. In fact, the Company's financial state was so dire that the 2008 Board
13 actually began discussing filing bankruptcy at or around the same time that the Company
14 began offering the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
15

16 612. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board also was or should have been
17 aware and / or approved of the offering and ongoing solicitation of investments in the 2008
18 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures after it was determined that the Company would
19 file bankruptcy, and "management" had approached DeWaay about the "stalking horse"
20 bid. Further, the 2009 Board rejected the proposed \$5.2 M in funding, which could have
21 obviated the bankruptcy filing.
22

23
24 613. Moreover, upon information and belief, the 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards
25 were or should have been aware and / or approved of the information about the Company's
26 financial affairs, including projections and other figures, that was communicated to the
27 Investors in connection with the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and
28 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, even though that information was

1 selectively communicated and taken out of context in relation to the Company's finances as
2 a whole.

3
4 614. The 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards also knew or should have known that the
5 funds generated by prior Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which
6 ultimately impaired the Company's ability to repay the 2007 Series C Subordinated
7 Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.

8
9 615. The 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards knew or should have known the
10 information that was communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably
11 uncertain, and that additional information regarding the true state of the Company's
12 financial affairs needed to be communicated to the Investors when statements were made
13 about the Company's projections and other financial figures.

14
15 616. The 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards were reckless in taking these acts and
16 making these omissions because they knew or should have known that the offering and
17 solicitation of investments in the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and
18 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures and failure to disclose information and the
19 circumstances surrounding the offerings fully would cause the Investors to participate in
20 the offerings without full knowledge or an understanding of the risks involved.

21
22 617. The 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards were further reckless because they were
23 privy to Domin-8's financials and other information that showed that the Company would
24 be unable to repay the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series
25 D Senior Subordinated Debentures and may not survive even with the infusion of
26 additional funds.
27
28

1 618. Alternatively, the 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards' conduct of approving and
2 offering the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior
3 Subordinated Debentures, as well as their failure to fully disclose information and
4 circumstances surrounding the offering and solicitation of such investments, was intended
5 to entice the Investors to invest substantial sums of money in the 2007 Series C
6 Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
7

8
9 619. Because the 2007, 2008 and 2009 Boards' approval of the offering and
10 solicitation of the investments was recklessly calculated or intended to induce the Investors
11 to purchase the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D
12 Senior Subordinated Debentures, their acts and omissions were material to the Investors.
13

14 620. Investors relied on the 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards' reckless or intentional
15 acts and omissions by purchasing the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures
16 and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
17

18 621. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
19 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.
20

21 622. But for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards approving the offering and
22 solicitation of the investments and the selective dissemination of information about the
23 Company and its finances in connection with the same, the Investors would not have
24 purchased the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D
25 Senior Subordinated Debentures.
26

27 623. The acts and omissions of the 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards caused losses to
28 Investors in the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D

1 Senior Subordinated Debentures because the Investors paid for debt securities that were
2 essentially worthless since the Company was insolvent or near insolvent at the time of
3 issuance.
4

5 624. Further, the acts and omissions of the 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards resulted
6 in the loss of the Investors' investments by inducing investments in the Company that
7 increased the Company's debt, which was a substantial factor contributing to the
8 bankruptcy.
9

10 625. The acts and omissions also caused the Investors in the 2007 Series C
11 Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures
12 to incur losses because the investments subordinated their debt and caused them to assume
13 an inferior lien position in the event of nonpayment.
14

15 626. The 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards are jointly and severally liable for these
16 losses to the Investors.
17

18 CLAIM II

19 Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

21 (By Investors in the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures Against 22 2007 Board)

23 627. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
24 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.
25

26 628. In connection with the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures,
27 the 2007 Board engaged in acts, practices, and / or courses of conduct that operated as a
28 fraud and deceit upon the Investors.

1 629. The 2007 Board approved the offering and ongoing solicitation of
2 investments in the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures, despite knowing
3 or should having known that the Company would be unable to re-pay the debt because it
4 had experienced anemic growth relative to its projections over the years, had soaring
5 expenses, and was already overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions and debt
6 offerings.
7

8
9 630. Upon information and belief, the 2007 Board was or should have been aware
10 and / or approved of the information about the Company's financial affairs, including
11 projections and other figures, that was communicated to the Investors in connection with
12 the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures, even though that information
13 was selectively communicated and taken out of context in relation to the Company's
14 finances as a whole.
15

16
17 631. Moreover, the 2007 Board also knew or should have known that the funds
18 generated by prior Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which
19 ultimately impaired the Company's ability to repay the 2007 Series A and Series B
20 Subordinated Debentures.
21

22 632. The 2007 Board knew or should have known the information that was
23 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
24 additional information regarding the true state of the Company's financial affairs needed to
25 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company's
26 projections and other financial figures.
27
28

1 633. The 2007 Board was reckless in taking these acts and making these
2 omissions because they knew or should have known that the offering and solicitation of
3 investments in the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures and failure to
4 disclose information and the circumstances surrounding the offerings fully would cause the
5 Investors to participate in the offerings without full knowledge or an understanding of the
6 risks involved.
7

8
9 634. The 2007 Board was further reckless because they were privy to Domin-8's
10 financials and other information that showed that the Company would be unable to repay
11 the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures and may not survive even with
12 the infusion of additional funds.

13
14 635. Alternatively, the 2007 Board's conduct of approving and offering the 2007
15 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures, as well as their failure to fully disclose
16 information and circumstances surrounding the offering and solicitation of such
17 investments, was intended to entice the Investors to invest substantial sums of money in the
18 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures.
19

20
21 636. Because the 2007 Board's approval of the offering and solicitation of the
22 investments was recklessly calculated or intended to induce the Investors to purchase the
23 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures, their acts and omissions were
24 material to the Investors.
25

26 637. Investors relied on the 2007 Board's reckless or intentional acts and
27 omissions by purchasing the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures.
28

1 638. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
2 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.

3 639. But for the 2007 Board approving the offering and solicitation of the
4 investments and the selective dissemination of information about the Company and its
5 finances, the Investors would not have purchased the 2007 Series A and Series B
6 Subordinated Debentures.
7

8 640. The acts and omissions of the 2007 Board resulted in the loss of the
9 Investors' investments in the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures because
10 the Investors paid for debt securities that were essentially worthless since the Company
11 was insolvent or near insolvent at the time of issuance.
12

13 641. Further, the acts and omissions of the 2007 Board resulted in the loss of the
14 Investors' investments by inducing investments in the Company that increased the
15 Company's debt, which was a substantial factor contributing to the bankruptcy.
16

17 642. The acts and omissions also caused the Investors in the 2007 Series A and
18 Series B Subordinated Debentures to incur losses because they subordinated their debt and
19 assumed an inferior lien position in the event of nonpayment.
20

21 643. The 2007 Board is jointly and severally liable for these losses to the
22 Investors.
23

24 ...
25

26 ...
27

28 ...
...

CLAIM III

**Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

**(By Investors in Series A Preferred Stock and
Common Stock Against the 2007 Board)**

644. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

645. In connection with offering the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock, the 2007 Board engaged in acts, practices, and / or courses of conduct that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the Investors.

646. The 2007 Board approved the offering and ongoing solicitation of investments in the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock, despite knowing or should having known that the Company would be unable to re-pay the debt because it had experienced anemic growth relative to its projections over the years, had soaring expenses, and was already overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions and debt offerings.

647. Upon information and belief, the 2007 Board was or should have been aware and / or approved of the information about the Company's financial affairs, including projections and other figures, that was communicated to the Investors in connection with the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock, even though that information was selectively communicated and taken out of context in relation to the Company's finances as a whole.

648. Moreover, the 2007 Board also knew or should have known that the funds generated by prior Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which

1 ultimately impaired the Company's ability to pay a return on the Series A Preferred Stock
2 and Common Stock.

3
4 649. The 2007 Board knew or should have known the information that was
5 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
6 additional information regarding the true state of the Company's financial affairs needed to
7 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company's
8 projections and other financial figures.

9
10 650. The 2007 Board was reckless in taking these acts and making these
11 omissions because they knew or should have known that the offering and solicitation of
12 investments in the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock and failure to disclose
13 information and the circumstances surrounding the offerings fully would cause the
14 Investors to participate in the offerings without full knowledge or an understanding of the
15 risks involved.

16
17
18 651. The 2007 Board was further reckless because they were privy to Domin-8's
19 financials and other information that showed that the Company would be unable to pay a
20 return on the investments in the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock, and that the
21 Company may not survive even with the infusion of additional funds.

22
23 652. Alternatively, the 2007 Board's conduct of approving and offering the Series
24 A Preferred Stock and Common Stock, as well as their failure to fully disclose information
25 and circumstances surrounding the offering and solicitation of such investments, was
26 intended to entice the Investors to invest substantial sums of money in the Series A
27 Preferred Stock and Common Stock.
28

1 653. Because the 2007 Board's approval of the offering and solicitation of the
2 investments was recklessly calculated or intended to induce the Investors to purchase the
3 Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock, their acts and omissions were material to the
4 Investors.
5

6 654. Investors relied on the 2007 Board's reckless or intentional acts and
7 omissions by purchasing the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock.
8

9 655. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
10 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.
11

12 656. But for the 2007 Board approving the offering and solicitation of the
13 investments and the selective dissemination of information about the Company and its
14 finances, the Investors would not have purchased the Series A Preferred Stock and
15 Common Stock.
16

17 657. The acts and omissions of the 2007 Board resulted in the loss of the
18 Investors' investments in the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock because the
19 Investors paid for equity securities that were essentially worthless since, unbeknownst to
20 the Investors, the Company was insolvent or near insolvent at the time of issuance.
21

22 658. Further, the acts and omissions of the 2007 Board resulted in the loss of the
23 Investors' investments by causing them to approve measures that increased the Company's
24 debt, which was a substantial factor contributing to the bankruptcy.
25

26 659. The 2007 Board is jointly and severally liable for these losses to the
27 Investors.
28

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1 **CLAIM IV**

2 **Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and**
 3 **Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

4 **(By Investors in Domin-8 LLC Who Exchanged Debt and Equity Securities in**
 5 **Domin-8 LLC for Common Stock in Domin-8 Inc., Against the 2006 Board⁵)**

6 660. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
 7 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

8 661. In connection with the Exchange Offer, the 2006 Board engaged in acts,
 9 practices, and / or courses of conduct that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the Investors.

10 662. The 2006 Board approved and recommended the Exchange Offer that
 11 converted all debt and equity securities in Domin-8 LLC into Common Stock in Domin-8
 12 Inc., despite knowing or should having known that the Company would be unable to re-pay
 13 the debt because it had experienced anemic growth relative to its projections over the years,
 14 had soaring expenses, and was already overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions
 15 and debt offerings.

16 663. Upon information and belief, the 2006 Board was or should have been aware
 17 and / or approved of the information about the Company's financial affairs, including
 18 projections and other figures, that was communicated to the Investors in connection with
 19 the Exchange Offer, even though that information was selectively communicated and taken
 20 out of context in relation to the Company's finances as a whole.

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⁵ For purposes of all claims in this Complaint, the Defendants from the 2006 Board include: (1) Greg McGrath; (2) Sean D. Curran; and (3) Charles V. Shamblee III.

1 664. Moreover, the 2006 Board also knew or should have known that the funds
2 generated by prior Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which
3 ultimately impaired the Company's ability to pay a return on the Series A Preferred Stock
4 and Common Stock.
5

6 665. The 2006 Board knew or should have known the information that was
7 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
8 additional information regarding the true state of the Company's financial affairs needed to
9 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company's
10 projections and other financial figures.
11

12 666. The 2006 Board was reckless in taking these acts and making these
13 omissions because they knew or should have known that their approval and
14 recommendation of the Exchange Offer and failure to disclose information and the
15 circumstances surrounding the same fully would cause the Investors to participate without
16 full knowledge or an understanding of the risks involved.
17

18 667. The 2006 Board was further reckless because they were privy to Domin-8's
19 financials and other information that showed that the Company would be unable to pay a
20 return on equity investments and may not survive even if the Exchange Offer was
21 approved.
22

23 668. Alternatively, the 2006 Board's conduct of approving and recommending the
24 Exchange Offer, as well as their failure to fully disclose information and circumstances
25 surrounding the offering and solicitation of such investments, was intended to entice the
26 Investors to approve the Exchange Offer.
27
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1 669. Because the 2006 Board's approval of the offering and solicitation of the
2 investments was recklessly calculated or intended to induce the Investors to approve the
3 Exchange Offer and exchange their investments in Domin-8 LLC into Common Stock in
4 Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions Inc., their acts and omissions were material to the Investors.
5

6 670. Investors relied on the 2006 Board's reckless or intentional acts and
7 omissions by approving the Exchange Offer and exchanging their investments in Domin-8
8 LLC into Common Stock in Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions Inc.
9

10 671. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
11 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.
12

13 672. But for the 2006 Board approving and recommending the Exchange Offer
14 and the selective dissemination of information about the Company and its finances, the
15 Investors would not have approved the Exchange Offer and exchanged their investments in
16 Domin-8 LLC into Common Stock in Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions Inc.
17

18 673. The acts and omissions of the 2006 Board resulted in the loss of the
19 Investors' investments through the Exchange Offer because the Investors exchanged their
20 debt and equity securities in Domin-8 LLC for Common Stock in Domin-8 Inc., which was
21 essentially worthless since, unbeknownst to the Investors, the Company was insolvent or
22 near insolvent at the time of the exchange.
23

24 674. Additionally, the Investors in debt securities in Domin-8 LLC incurred losses
25 because, had they not approved the Exchange Offer and exchanged their debt securities in
26 Domin-8 LLC for equity securities in Domin-8 Inc., they would have retained positions as
27 creditors that were superior to their positions as equity holders after the exchange.
28

1 675. The 2006 Board is jointly and severally liable for these losses to the
2 Investors.

3 4 CLAIM V

5 Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and 6 Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

7 (By Investors in the 2006 Series D Subordinated 8 Convertible Debentures Against the 2004 Board⁶)

9 676. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
10 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

11 677. In connection with the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures,
12 the 2004 Board engaged in acts, practices, and / or courses of conduct that operated as a
13 fraud and deceit upon the Investors.
14

15 678. The 2004 Board approved the offering and ongoing solicitation of
16 investments in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, despite knowing
17 or should having known that the Company would be unable to re-pay the debt because it
18 had experienced anemic growth relative to its projections over the years, had soaring
19 expenses, and was already overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions and debt
20 offerings.
21

22 679. Upon information and belief, the 2004 Board was or should have been aware
23 and / or approved of the information about the Company's financial affairs, including
24 projections and other figures, that was communicated to the Investors in connection with
25
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28 ⁶ For purposes of all claims in this Complaint, the Defendants from the 2004 Board consists of: (1) Greg McGrath; (2) Sean D. Curran; (3) Charles V. Shamblee III; and (4) J. Robert Routt. T

1 the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, even though that information was
2 selectively communicated and taken out of context in relation to the Company's finances as
3 a whole.
4

5 680. Moreover, the 2004 Board also knew or should have known that the funds
6 generated by prior Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which
7 ultimately impaired the Company's ability to repay the 2006 Series D Subordinated
8 Convertible Debentures.
9

10 681. The 2004 Board knew or should have known the information that was
11 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
12 additional information regarding the true state of the Company's financial affairs needed to
13 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company's
14 projections and other financial figures.
15

16 682. The 2004 Board was reckless in taking these acts and making these
17 omissions because they knew or should have known that the offering and solicitation of
18 investments in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures and failure to
19 disclose information and the circumstances surrounding the offering fully would cause the
20 Investors to participate in the offerings without full knowledge or an understanding of the
21 risks involved.
22

23 683. The 2004 Board was further reckless because they were privy to Domin-8's
24 financials and other information that showed that the Company would be unable to repay
25 the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures and may not survive even with the
26 infusion of additional funds.
27
28

1 684. Alternatively, the 2004 Board's conduct of approving and offering the 2006
2 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, as well as their failure to fully disclose
3 information and circumstances surrounding the offering and solicitation of such
4 investments, was intended to entice the Investors to invest substantial sums of money in the
5 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures.
6

7 685. Because the 2004 Board's approval of the offering and solicitation of the
8 investments was recklessly calculated or intended to induce the Investors to purchase the
9 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, their acts and omissions were
10 material to the Investors.
11

12 686. Investors relied on the 2004 Board's reckless or intentional acts and
13 omissions by purchasing the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures.
14

15 687. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
16 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.
17

18 688. But for the 2004 Board approving the offering and solicitation of the
19 investments and the selective dissemination of information about the company and its
20 finances, the Investors would not have purchased the 2006 Series D Subordinated
21 Convertible Debentures.
22

23 689. The acts and omissions of the 2004 Board resulted in the loss of the
24 Investors' investments in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures because
25 the Investors paid for debt securities that were essentially worthless since the Company
26 was insolvent or near insolvent at the time of issuance.
27
28

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1 690. Further, the acts and omissions of the 2004 Board resulted in the loss of the
2 Investors' investments by inducing investments in the Company that increased the
3 Company's debt, which was a substantial factor contributing to the bankruptcy.
4

5 691. The acts and omissions also caused the Investors in the 2006 Series D
6 Subordinated Convertible Debentures to incur losses because they subordinated their debt
7 and assumed an inferior lien position in the event of nonpayment.
8

9 692. The 2004 Board is jointly and severally liable for these losses to the
10 Investors.
11

12 CLAIM VI

13 Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and 14 Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

15 (By Investors in 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 16 Series D Subordinated Debenture Against McGrath)

17 693. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
18 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

19 694. In connection with offering the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible
20 Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures to the Investors, McGrath
21 engaged in acts, practices, and / or courses of conduct that operated as a fraud and deceit
22 upon the Investors.
23

24 695. McGrath made specific representations to the Investors about the Company's
25 projections and other financial figures.
26

27 696. McGrath communicated this information selectively and in isolation of the
28 Company's finances as a whole and the circumstances surrounding the offerings.

1 697. McGrath made these representations and omissions, despite knowing or
2 should having known that the Company would be unable to repay the debt because it had
3 experienced anemic growth relative to its projections over the years, had soaring expenses,
4 and was already overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions and debt offerings.
5

6 698. In particular, McGrath did not communicate or fully disclose information
7 about the Company's finances and the circumstances surrounding the offerings relative to
8 the acquisition strategy, which was placing a tremendous financial strain on the Company.
9

10 699. McGrath also did not disclose that funds generated through the prior
11 offerings had not been used to pay for the acquisitions, as evidenced by the Seller Notes,
12 or, alternatively, that the funds could not be used as such because they had to be used to
13 absorb increased operating costs from the acquisitions.
14

15 700. In addition, McGrath never corrected projections that were communicated to
16 the Investors to reflect the most current, update-to-date financial information available to
17 the Company.
18

19 701. McGrath also represented to the Investors that the Company would be poised
20 for an IPO or a buy-out in two-to-three years' time to lead them to believe that the 2007
21 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures were a sound investment and incidental to
22 the Company achieving this goal.
23

24 702. Even more specifically, McGrath represented to Investors in Arizona that
25 their shares of stock would rise from \$3.81 per share to \$55-\$60 per share.
26

27 ...
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1 703. McGrath further represented to the Investors that the 2007 Series C Senior
2 Subordinated Convertible Debentures would be the final opportunity to invest in Domin-8
3 before it went public or was sold to another company.
4

5 704. McGrath also knew or should have known that the funds generated by prior
6 Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which ultimately impaired the
7 Company's ability to repay the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and
8 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
9

10 705. McGrath knew or should have known the information that was
11 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
12 additional information regarding the true state of the Company's financial affairs needed to
13 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company's
14 projections and other financial figures.
15
16

17 706. McGrath was reckless because he was privy to Domin-8's financials and
18 other information that showed that the Company would be unable to repay the 2007 Series
19 C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
20 Debentures and may not survive even with the infusion of additional funds.
21

22 707. McGrath was further reckless because he knew or should have known that
23 the offering and solicitation of investments in the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible
24 Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures and failure to disclose
25 information and the circumstances surrounding the offerings fully would cause the
26 Investors to participate in the offerings without full knowledge or an understanding of the
27 risks involved.
28

1 708. Alternatively, McGrath's conduct of approving and offering the 2007 Series
2 C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
3 Debentures, as well as his failure to fully disclose information and circumstances
4 surrounding the offering and solicitation of such investments, was intended to entice the
5 Investors to invest substantial sums of money in the 2007 Series C Subordinated
6 Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
7

8
9 709. Because McGrath's representations and omissions were recklessly calculated
10 or intended to induce the Investors to purchase the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible
11 Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, his representations and
12 omissions were material to the Investors.
13

14 710. Investors relied on McGrath's reckless or intentional representations and
15 omissions by purchasing the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008
16 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
17

18 711. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
19 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.
20

21 712. But for McGrath selectively disseminating information about the Company
22 and its finances, the Investors would not have purchased the 2007 Series C Subordinated
23 Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
24

25 713. The representations and omissions of McGrath resulted in the loss of the
26 Investors' investments in the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008
27 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures because the Investors paid for debt securities that
28

1 were essentially worthless since the company was insolvent or near insolvent at the time of
2 issuance.

3
4 714. Further, the representations and omissions of McGrath resulted in the loss of
5 the Investors' investments by inducing investments in the Company that increased the
6 Company's debt, which was a substantial factor contributing to the bankruptcy.

7
8 715. The representations and omissions also caused the Investors in the 2007
9 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures and 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
10 Debentures to incur losses because they subordinated their debt and assumed an inferior
11 lien position in the event of nonpayment.

12
13 716. McGrath is liable for these losses to the Investors.

14 CLAIM VII

15 Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and 16 Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

17 (By Investors in the 2007 Series A and Series B 18 Subordinated Debentures Against McGrath)

19 717. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
20 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

21
22 718. In connection with offering the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated
23 Debentures to the Investors, McGrath engaged in acts, practices, and / or courses of
24 conduct that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the Investors.

25
26 719. McGrath made specific representations about the Company's projections and
27 omissions about the Company's financial affairs.

28

1 720. McGrath communicated this information selectively and in isolation of the
2 Company's finances as a whole and the circumstances surrounding the offerings.

3 721. McGrath made these representations and omissions, despite knowing or
4 should having known that the Company would be unable to repay the debt because it had
5 experienced anemic growth relative to its projections over the years, had soaring expenses,
6 and was already overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions and debt offerings.

7 722. In particular, McGrath did not communicate or fully disclose information
8 about the Company's finances and the circumstances surrounding the offerings relative to
9 the acquisition strategy, which was placing a tremendous financial strain on the Company.

10 723. McGrath also did not disclose that funds generated through the prior
11 offerings had not been used to pay for the acquisitions, as evidenced by the Seller Notes,
12 or, alternatively, that the funds could not be used as such because they had to be used to
13 absorb increased operating costs from the acquisitions.

14 724. In addition, McGrath never corrected projections that were communicated to
15 the Investors to reflect the most current, update-to-date financial information available to
16 the Company.

17 725. Upon information and belief, McGrath also represented to the Investors that
18 the Company would be poised for an IPO or a buy-out in two-to-three years' time to lead
19 them to believe that the Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures were sound
20 investments and incidental to the Company achieving this goal.

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1 726. McGrath further represented to the Investors that he “expect[ed] th[e] debt
2 offering to go very quickly,” and that the Company “prefer[red] to reward ... existing
3 shareholders with th[e] lucrative monthly paying investment”
4

5 727. McGrath also knew or should have known that the funds generated by prior
6 Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which ultimately impaired the
7 Company’s ability to repay the Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures.
8

9 728. McGrath knew or should have known the information that was
10 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
11 additional information regarding the true state of the Company’s financial affairs needed to
12 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company’s
13 projections and other financial figures.
14

15 729. McGrath was reckless because he was privy to Domin-8’s financials and
16 other information that showed that the Company would be unable to repay the Series A and
17 Series B Subordinated Debentures and may not survive even with the infusion of additional
18 funds.
19

20 730. McGrath was further reckless because he knew or should have known that
21 the offering and solicitation of investments in the Series A and Series B Subordinated
22 Debentures and failure to disclose information and the circumstances surrounding the
23 offerings fully would cause the Investors to participate in the offerings without full
24 knowledge or an understanding of the risks involved.
25

26 731. Alternatively, McGrath’s conduct of approving and offering the Series A and
27 Series B Subordinated Debentures, as well as his failure to fully disclose information and
28

1 circumstances surrounding the offering and solicitation of such investments, was intended
2 to entice the Investors to invest substantial sums of money in the Series A and Series B
3 Subordinated Debentures.
4

5 732. Because McGrath's representations and omissions were recklessly calculated
6 or intended to induce the Investors to purchase the Series A and Series B Subordinated
7 Debentures, his representations and omissions were material to the Investors.
8

9 733. Investors relied on McGrath's reckless or intentional representations and
10 omissions by purchasing the Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures.
11

12 734. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
13 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.
14

15 735. But for McGrath selectively disseminating information about the Company
16 and its finances, the Investors would not have purchased the Series A and Series B
17 Subordinated Debentures.
18

19 736. The representations and omissions of McGrath resulted in the loss of the
20 Investors' investments in the Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures because the
21 Investors paid for debt securities that were essentially worthless since the Company was
22 insolvent or near insolvent at the time of issuance.
23

24 737. Further, the representations and omissions of McGrath resulted in the loss of
25 the Investors' investments by inducing investments in the Company that increased the
26 Company's debt, which was a substantial factor contributing to the bankruptcy.
27

28 738. Additionally, the Investors incurred losses because they would have
purchased securities other than the Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures.

1 739. The acts and omissions also caused the Investors in the Series A and Series B
2 Subordinated Debentures to incur losses because they subordinated their debt and assumed
3 an inferior lien position in the event of nonpayment.
4

5 740. McGrath is liable for these losses to the Investors.

6 CLAIM VIII

7 Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and 8 Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

9 (By Investors in Series A Preferred Stock and 10 Common Stock Against McGrath)

11 741. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
12 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.
13

14 742. In connection with offering the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock
15 to the Investors, McGrath engaged in acts, practices, and / or courses of conduct that
16 operated as a fraud and deceit upon the Investors.
17

18 743. McGrath made specific representations about the Company's projections and
19 omissions about the Company's financial affairs.
20

21 744. McGrath communicated this information selectively and in isolation of the
22 Company's finances as a whole and the circumstances surrounding the offerings.
23

24 745. McGrath made these representations and omissions, despite knowing or
25 should having known that the Company would be unable to pay a return on the investments
26 because it had experienced anemic growth relative to its projections over the years, had
27 soaring expenses, and was already overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions and
28 debt offerings.

1 746. In particular, McGrath did not communicate or fully disclose information
2 about the Company's finances and the circumstances surrounding the offerings relative to
3 the acquisition strategy, which was placing a tremendous financial strain on the Company.
4

5 747. McGrath did not disclose that funds generated through the prior offerings had
6 not been used to pay for the acquisitions, as evidenced by the Seller Notes, or,
7 alternatively, that the funds could not be used as such because they had to be used to
8 absorb increased operating costs from the acquisitions.
9

10 748. In addition, McGrath never corrected projections that were communicated to
11 the Investors to reflect the most current, update-to-date financial information available to
12 the Company.
13

14 749. Upon information and belief, McGrath also represented to the Investors that
15 the Company would be poised for an IPO or a buy-out in two-to-three years' time to lead
16 them to believe that the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock were sound
17 investments and incidental to the Company achieving this goal.
18

19 750. McGrath also knew or should have known that the funds generated by prior
20 Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which ultimately impaired the
21 Company's ability to pay a return on equity investments in the Series A Preferred Stock
22 and Common Stock.
23

24 751. McGrath knew or should have known the information that was
25 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
26 additional information regarding the true state of the Company's financial affairs needed to
27
28

1 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company's
2 projections and other financial figures.

3
4 752. McGrath was reckless because he was privy to Domin-8's financials and
5 other information that showed that the Company would be unable to pay a return on equity
6 investments the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock and may not survive even
7 with the infusion of additional funds.

8
9 753. McGrath was further reckless because he knew or should have known that
10 the offering and solicitation of investments in the Series A Preferred Stock and Common
11 Stock and failure to disclose information and the circumstances surrounding the offerings
12 fully would cause the Investors to participate in the offerings without full knowledge or an
13 understanding of the risks involved.

14
15 754. Alternatively, McGrath's conduct of approving and offering the Series A
16 Preferred Stock and Common Stock, as well as his failure to fully disclose information and
17 circumstances surrounding the offering and solicitation of such investments, was intended
18 to entice the Investors to invest substantial sums of money in the Series A Preferred Stock
19 and Common Stock.

20
21 755. Because McGrath's representations and omissions were recklessly calculated
22 or intended to induce the Investors to purchase the Series A Preferred Stock and Common
23 Stock, his representations and omissions were material to the Investors.

24
25 756. Investors relied on McGrath's reckless or intentional representations and
26 omissions by purchasing the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock.
27
28

1 764. McGrath made specific representations about the Company's projections and
2 omissions about the Company's financial affairs.

3 765. McGrath communicated this information selectively and in isolation of the
4 Company's finances as a whole and the circumstances surrounding the Exchange Offer.

5 766. McGrath made these representations and omissions, despite knowing or
6 should have known that the Company would be unable to pay a return on the investments
7 because it had experienced anemic growth relative to its projections over the years, had
8 soaring expenses, and was already overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions and
9 debt offerings.

10 767. In particular, McGrath did not communicate or fully disclose information
11 about the Company's finances and the circumstances surrounding the offerings relative to
12 the acquisition strategy, which was placing a tremendous financial strain on the Company.

13 768. McGrath did not disclose that funds generated through the prior offerings had
14 not been used to pay for the acquisitions, as evidenced by the Seller Notes, or,
15 alternatively, that the funds could not be used as such because they had to be used to
16 absorb increased operating costs from the acquisitions.

17 769. In addition, McGrath never corrected projections that were communicated to
18 the Investors to reflect the most current, update-to-date financial information available to
19 the Company.

20 770. Upon information and belief, McGrath also represented to the Investors that
21 the Company would be poised for an IPO or a buy-out in two-to-three years' time to lead
22 them to believe that the Exchange Offer was necessary to achieve this goal.

1 771. McGrath further represented that the additional capital generated through the
2 Exchange Offer would be used “to grow the Company beyond what [the] most aggressive
3 projections from last year suggested” to lead them to approve the Exchange Offer.
4

5 772. McGrath also knew or should have known that the funds generated by prior
6 Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which ultimately impaired the
7 Company’s ability to pay a return on equity investments in Common Stock.
8

9 773. McGrath knew or should have known the information that was
10 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
11 additional information regarding the true state of the Company’s financial affairs needed to
12 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company’s
13 projections and other financial figures.
14

15 774. McGrath was reckless because he was privy to Domin-8’s financials and
16 other information that showed that the Company would be unable to pay a return on equity
17 investments in the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock and may not survive even
18 if the Exchange Offer was approved.
19
20

21 775. McGrath was further reckless because he knew or should have known that
22 the offering and solicitation of investments in the Series A Preferred Stock and Common
23 Stock and failure to disclose information and the circumstances surrounding the offerings
24 fully would cause the Investors to participate in the offerings without full knowledge or an
25 understanding of the risks involved.
26

27 776. Alternatively, McGrath’s conduct of approving and recommending the
28 Exchange Offer, as well as his failure to fully disclose information and circumstances

1 surrounding the same, was intended to entice the Investors to approve the Exchange Offer
2 and exchange their investments in Domin-8 LLC into Common Stock in Domin-8
3 Enterprise Solutions Inc.
4

5 777. Because McGrath's representations and omissions were recklessly calculated
6 or intended to induce the Investors to approve the Exchange Offer and exchange their
7 investments in Domin-8 LLC into Common Stock in Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions Inc. his
8 representations and omissions were material to the Investors.
9

10 778. Investors relied on McGrath's reckless acts and omissions by approving the
11 Exchange Offer and exchanging their investments in Domin-8 LLC into Common Stock.
12

13 779. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
14 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.
15

16 780. But for McGrath recommending the Exchange Offer and selectively
17 disseminating information about the Company and its finances, the Investors would not
18 have approved the Exchange Offer and exchanged their investments in Domin-8 LLC into
19 Common Stock in Domin-8 Enterprise Solutions Inc.
20

21 781. The acts and omissions of McGrath resulted in the loss of the Investors'
22 investments through the Exchange Offer because the Investors exchanged their debt and
23 equity securities in Domin-8 LLC for Common Stock in Domin-8 Inc., which was
24 essentially worthless since, unbeknownst to the Investors, the Company was insolvent or
25 near insolvent at the time of the exchange.
26

27 782. Additionally, the Investors in debt securities in Domin-8 LLC incurred losses
28 because, had they not approved the Exchange Offer and exchanged their debt securities in

1 Domin-8 LLC for equity securities in Domin-8 Inc., they would have retained positions as
2 creditors that were superior to their positions as equity holders after the exchange.

3
4 783. McGrath is liable for these losses to the Investors.

5 **CLAIM X**

6 **Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and**
7 **Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

8 **(By Investors in 2006 Series D Subordinated**
9 **Convertible Debentures Against McGrath)**

10 784. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
11 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

12
13 785. In connection with offering the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
14 Debentures to the Investors, McGrath engaged in acts, practices, and / or courses of
15 conduct that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the Investors.

16
17 786. McGrath made specific representations about the Company's projections and
18 omissions about the Company's financial affairs.

19 787. McGrath communicated this information selectively and in isolation of the
20 Company's finances as a whole and the circumstances surrounding the 2006 Series D
21 Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

22
23 788. McGrath made these representations and omissions, despite knowing or
24 should having known that the Company would be unable to pay a return on the investments
25 because it had experienced anemic growth relative to its projections over the years, had
26 soaring expenses, and was already overburdened with debt from previous acquisitions and
27 debt offerings.
28

1 789. In particular, McGrath did not communicate or fully disclose information
2 about the Company's finances and the circumstances surrounding the offerings relative to
3 the acquisition strategy, which was placing a tremendous financial strain on the Company.
4

5 790. McGrath did not disclose that funds generated through the prior offerings had
6 not been used to pay for the acquisitions, as evidenced by the Seller Notes, or,
7 alternatively, that the funds could not be used as such because they had to be used to
8 absorb increased operating costs from the acquisitions.
9

10 791. In addition, McGrath never corrected projections that were communicated to
11 the Investors to reflect the most current, update-to-date financial information available to
12 the Company.
13

14 792. At the same time, McGrath continued to disclose inflated projections based
15 on the recent acquisitions, including Winning Edge and Rent Right, particularly with
16 respect to the substantial revenues generated through the sale of value-added services and
17 the overall effect of the acquisitions on the Company's finances, while informing the
18 Investors that acquisition costs were being reduced.
19
20

21 793. Upon information and belief, McGrath also represented to the Investors that
22 the Company would be poised for an IPO or a buy-out in two-to-three years' time to lead
23 them to believe that the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures were sound
24 investments and incidental to the Company achieving this goal.
25

26 794. McGrath also knew or should have known that the funds generated by prior
27 Securities had all or in part not been used as represented, which ultimately impaired the
28 Company's ability to pay a return on equity investments in Common Stock.

1 795. McGrath knew or should have known the information that was
2 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
3 additional information regarding the true state of the Company's financial affairs needed to
4 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company's
5 projections and other financial figures.

6
7 796. McGrath was reckless because he was privy to Domin-8's financials and
8 other information that showed that the Company would be unable to repay 2006 Series D
9 Subordinated Convertible Debentures and may not survive even with the infusion of
10 additional funds.

11
12 797. McGrath was further reckless because he knew or should have known that
13 the offering and solicitation of investments in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
14 Debentures and failure to disclose information and the circumstances surrounding the
15 offering fully would cause the Investors to participate in the offerings without full
16 knowledge or an understanding of the risks involved.

17
18 798. Alternatively, McGrath's conduct of approving and offering the 2006 Series
19 D Subordinated Convertible Debentures, as well as his failure to fully disclose information
20 and circumstances surrounding the same, was intended to entice the Investors to purchase
21 the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

22
23 799. Because McGrath's representations and omissions were recklessly calculated
24 or intended to induce the Investors to purchase the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
25 Debentures, his representations and omissions were material to the Investors.
26
27
28

1 800. Investors relied on McGrath's reckless representations and omissions by
2 purchasing the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

3
4 801. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
5 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.

6 802. But for McGrath selectively disseminating information about the Company
7 and its finances, the Investors would not have purchased the 2006 Series D Subordinated
8 Convertible Debentures.

9
10 803. The representations and omissions of McGrath resulted in the loss of the
11 Investors' investments in the 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures because
12 the Investors paid for debt securities that were essentially worthless since the Company
13 was insolvent or near insolvent at the time of issuance.

14
15 804. Further, the representations and omissions of McGrath resulted in the loss of
16 the Investors' investments by inducing investments in the Company that increased the
17 Company's debt, which was a substantial factor contributing to the bankruptcy.

18
19 805. McGrath is liable for these losses to the Investors.

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1 **CLAIM XI**

2 **Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 20**
 3 **of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

4 **(By All Investors⁷ in Domin-8, Inc. Against the 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 Boards⁸**

5 806. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
 6 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.
 7

8 807. McGrath violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by recklessly making
 9 representations and omissions that were intended to entice the Investors to exchange and /
 10 or purchase the Securities.
 11

12 808. The Boards directly and / or indirectly retained control over McGrath, who
 13 attended board meetings in his capacities as President and as a member of the Boards.
 14

15 809. Upon information and belief, the Boards held frequent meetings, especially
 16 as the financial condition of the Company worsened.
 17

18 810. Upon information and belief, the Boards discussed the financial state of the
 19 Company and the communications that McGrath would make on behalf of the Company.
 20

21 811. Certain written statements from McGrath containing the misrepresentations
 22 and omissions regarding offerings also expressly implicate the Boards.
 23

24 ⁷ For purposes of the claims in this Complaint, these include Investors in: (1)
 25 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures; (2) 2007 Series C Subordinated
 26 Convertible Debentures; (3) 2007 Series A Subordinated Debentures; (4) 2007 Series B
 27 Subordinated Debentures; (5) Series A Preferred Stock; (6) Common Stock; (7) 2006
 28 Series D Subordinated Convertible Debentures; and (8) 2005 Series C Subordinated
 Convertible Debentures.

⁸ For purposes of this claim, the 2006–2009 Boards are collectively referred to
 as “Boards.”

1 812. In connection with the Exchange Offer, McGrath stated that “[he] and the full
2 Board recommend that [the Investors] vote to approve the transaction.”

3
4 813. Further, at or around the time of the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible
5 Debentures, McGrath stated “[o]ur Board of Directors has approved [the Senior Note
6 Offering] unanimously and we ask that you support their decision.”

7
8 814. Additionally, the Boards controlled or had the ability to control all
9 representations and omissions attributable to McGrath in connection with the offerings
10 because Domin-8 Enterprise Inc. was a relatively small company with a board consisting of
11 only four-to-five directors at the time that McGrath made the alleged misrepresentations
12 and omissions.

13
14 815. The majority of the directors on the Boards were also officers who
15 participated in the day-to-day business of the Company.

16
17 816. As a consequence of participating in the day-to-day business of the
18 Company, officers knew or should have known the state of the Company’s finances and the
19 inaccuracy of McGrath’s communications regarding the offerings.

20
21 817. For all of these reasons, the Boards could have controlled the content of
22 McGrath’s communications, but failed to do so.

23
24 818. As such, they are control persons within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the
25 Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

26 819. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
27 and omissions of the Boards until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.
28

1 820. As control persons, the Boards are jointly and severally liable for McGrath's
2 violation(s) of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.

3
4 **CLAIM XII**

5 **Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5**
6 **of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

7 **(By Investors in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures**
8 **Against Buettin and Thistleton)**

9 821. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
10 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

11 822. In connection with offering the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
12 Debentures to the Investors, Buettin and Thistleton engaged in acts, practices, and / or
13 courses of conduct that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the Investors.

14 823. Buettin and Thistleton made specific representations and omissions about the
15 Company's ongoing viability, particularly in light of the funds that were being generated
16 through the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.

17 824. Buettin and Thistleton characterized the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated
18 Debentures as "part of an overall solution as other alternatives would potentially negatively
19 affect the character or terms of [their] investments, whether debt or equity, and would also
20 potentially be dilutive to equity holders," and said that the "support" of the Investors was
21 "definitely require[d] ... in making the Offering a success."

22 825. At no point, however, did Buettin and Thistleton disclose that the Company
23 had recently contemplated filing bankruptcy.
24
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1 826. Buettin and Thistleton also did not disclose that they had been informed that
2 the majority of investment banks purportedly would not work with Domin-8 because it was
3 overleveraged with debt and would need to restructure or file bankruptcy before it could be
4 acquired.

5
6 827. Buettin and Thistleton knew or should have known the information that was
7 communicated to the Investors was inaccurate and / or reasonably uncertain, and that
8 additional information regarding the true state of the Company's financial affairs needed to
9 be communicated to the Investors when statements were made about the Company's
10 projections and other financial figures.

11
12 828. Buettin and Thistleton were reckless because he was privy to Domin-8's
13 financials and other information that showed that the Company would be unable to repay
14 the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures and may not survive even with the
15 infusion of additional funds.

16
17 829. Buettin and Thistleton were further reckless because he knew or should have
18 known that the offering and solicitation of investments in the 2008 Series D Senior
19 Subordinated Debentures and failure to disclose information and the circumstances
20 surrounding the offering fully would cause the Investors to participate in the offerings
21 without full knowledge or an understanding of the risks involved.

22
23 830. Alternatively, Buettin and Thistleton's conduct of approving and offering the
24 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, as well as their failure to fully disclose
25 information and circumstances surrounding the same, was intended to entice the Investors
26 to purchase the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
27
28

1 831. Because Buettin and Thistleton's representations and omissions were
2 recklessly calculated to induce and did induce the Investors to purchase the 2008 Series D
3 Senior Subordinated Debentures, their representations and omissions were material to the
4 Investors.
5

6 832. Investors relied on Buettin and Thistleton's reckless representations and
7 omissions by purchasing the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
8

9 833. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
10 and omissions until a reasonable time after the Company filed bankruptcy.
11

12 834. But for Buettin and Thistleton selectively disseminating information about
13 the Company and its finances, the Investors would not have purchased the 2008 Series D
14 Senior Subordinated Debentures.
15

16 835. The representations and omissions of the Buettin and Thistleton resulted in
17 the loss of the Investors' investments in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures
18 because the Investors paid for debt securities that were essentially worthless since the
19 Company was insolvent or near insolvent at the time of issuance.
20

21 836. Further, the representations and omissions of Buettin and Thistleton resulted
22 in the loss of the Investors' investments by inducing investments in the Company that
23 increased the Company's debt, which was a substantial factor contributing to the
24 bankruptcy.
25

26 837. The representations and omissions also caused the Investors in the 2008
27 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures to incur losses because they subordinated their
28 debt and assumed an inferior lien position in the event of nonpayment.

1 838. Buettin and Thistleton are jointly and severally liable for these losses to the
2 Investors.

3
4 **CLAIM XIII**

5 **Federal Securities Fraud in Violation of Section 20**
6 **of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934**

7 **(By Investors in the 2008 Series D Subordinated**
8 **Debenture Against the 2009 Board)**

9 839. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
10 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

11 840. Buettin and Thistleton violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by recklessly
12 making representations and omissions that were intended to entice the Investors to
13 purchase the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.

14 841. The 2009 Board directly and / or indirectly retained control over the 2008
15 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, who were and had been officers of the company.

16 842. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board controlled or had the ability to
17 control all representations and omissions attributable to Buettin and Thistleton in
18 connection with the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.

19 843. The 2009 Board controlled or had the ability to control all representations
20 and omissions attributable to Buettin and Thistleton in connection with the offerings
21 because Domin-8 Enterprise Inc. was a relatively small company with a board consisting of
22 only four-to-five directors at the time that Buettin and Thistleton made the alleged
23 misrepresentations and omissions.
24
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1 844. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board held frequent meetings,
2 especially as the financial condition of the Company worsened.

3
4 845. Upon information and belief, the 2009 Board discussed the financial state of
5 the Company and the communications that Buettin and Thistleton would make on behalf of
6 the Company.

7
8 846. The majority of the directors on the 2009 Board were also officers who
9 participated in the day-to-day business of the Company.

10 847. As a consequence of participating in the day-to-day business of the
11 Company, such officers knew or should have known the state of the Company's finances
12 and the inaccuracy of Buettin and Thistleton's communications regarding the offerings.

13
14 848. Upon information and belief, Buettin and Thistleton attended these meetings
15 as high-ranking executives of the Company who were intimately acquainted with its
16 finances and operations.

17
18 849. The 2009 Board could have controlled the content of Buettin and Thistleton's
19 communications, but failed to do so.

20
21 850. As such, they are control persons within the meaning of Section 20(a) of the
22 Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

23
24 851. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these acts
25 and omissions of the 2009 Board until a reasonable time after the Company filed
26 bankruptcy.

27 ...
28

(By Investors in Domin-8 LLC Who Exchanged Debt and Equity Securities in Domin-8 LLC for Common Stock in Domin-8 Inc. Against McGrath and the 2006 Board)

857. McGrath and the 2006 Board are jointly and severally liable for these damages.

• • •

CLAIM XV**Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Nondisclosure****(By Investors in Domin-8 LLC Who Exchanged Debt and Equity Securities in Domin-8 LLC for Common Stock in Domin-8 Inc. Against McGrath and the 2006 Board)**

858. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

859. McGrath and the 2006 Board were under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information within their control when requesting approval of the Exchange Offer.

860. McGrath and the 2006 Board breached this duty by selectively communicating information about the Company's finances and failing to disclose other information that was material to the Investors in connection with the Exchange Offer.

861. McGrath did not communicate or fully disclose information about the Company's finances and the circumstances surrounding the Exchange Offer relative to the acquisition strategy, which was placing a tremendous financial strain on the Company.

862. McGrath also did not disclose that funds generated through the prior offerings had not been used to pay for the acquisitions, as evidenced by the Seller Notes, or, alternatively, that the funds could not be used as such because they had to be used to absorb increased operating costs from the acquisitions.

863. In addition, McGrath never corrected projections that were communicated to the Investors to reflect the most current, update-to-date financial information available to the Company.

1 864. Upon information and belief, McGrath also represented to the Investors that
2 the Company would be poised for an IPO or a buy-out in two-to-three years' time to lead
3 them to believe that the Exchange Offer was necessary to achieve this goal.
4

5 865. McGrath further represented that the additional capital generated through the
6 Exchange Offer would be used "to grow the Company beyond what [the] most aggressive
7 projections from last year suggested" to lead them to approve the Exchange Offer.
8

9 866. Similarly, in approving and recommending the Exchange Offer that
10 converted all debt and equity securities in Domin-8 LLC into Common Stock in Domin-8
11 Inc., the 2006 Board did not disclose that the Company had experienced anemic growth
12 relative to its projections over the years, had soaring expenses, and was already
13 overburdened with debt from existing obligations and prior debt offerings.
14

15 867. Upon information and belief, the 2006 Board was also aware or should have
16 been aware and / or approved of the information about the Company's financial affairs,
17 including projections and other figures, that was communicated to the Investors in
18 connection with the Exchange Offer, even though that information was selectively
19 communicated and taken out of context in relation to the Company's finances as a whole.
20

21 868. The information that McGrath and the 2006 Board communicated selectively
22 and did not disclose to the Investors was material because there was a substantial
23 likelihood that the Investors would consider it important when deciding whether to approve
24 the Exchange Offer. In addition, the information impacted the information that had been
25 made available to the Investors.
26
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1 869. These measures subordinated the Investors' interests in the event of
2 bankruptcy, particularly to the extent that they held debt securities in Domin-8 LLC.

3
4 870. Further, these measures resulted in the loss of the Investors' investments
5 through the Exchange Offer because the Investors exchanged their debt and equity
6 securities in Domin-8 LLC for Common Stock in Domin-8 Inc., which was essentially
7 worthless since, unbeknownst to the Investors, the Company was insolvent or near
8 insolvent at the time of the exchange.

9
10 871. McGrath and the 2006 Board's breach of their fiduciary duty to disclose
11 information fully and fairly has damaged the Investors.

12
13 872. McGrath and the 2006 Board are jointly and severally liable for these
14 damages.

15
16 873. The Investors have standing to pursue these damages directly because the
17 acts alleged caused injury to them as Investors, not to the Company itself.

18 874. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these
19 violations until a reasonable time after the bankruptcy filing in September 2009 because
20 McGrath and the 2006 Board, through McGrath's representations and omissions, led the
21 Investors away from the truth regarding the Company's finances and were entrusted by the
22 Investors to exercise competence and act in good faith as fiduciaries.
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CLAIM XVI**Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Nondisclosure****(By Investors in Series A Preferred Stock and the 2007 Series A and Series B Subordinated Debentures Against McGrath and the 2007 Board)**

875. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

876. McGrath and the 2007 Board were under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information within their control when it requested approval of the Senior Notes and the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

877. This duty was owed both to debt and equity holders because, upon information and belief, the Company was insolvent or in the zone of insolvency at all material times when making the offerings and withholding other material information about the state of the Company's business and financial affairs.

878. McGrath and the 2007 Board breached this duty by selectively communicating information about the Company's finances and failing to disclose other information that was material to the Investors in connection with approving the Senior Notes and the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures.

879. In particular, McGrath and the 2007 Board did not disclose the facts and circumstances surrounding the use of funds generated through prior debt and equity offerings, including their use to pay soaring operating costs from the acquisitions.

880. Further, McGrath and the 2007 Board did not fully disclose the state of the Company's finances, particularly in light of projections.

1 881. The information that McGrath and the 2007 Board communicated selectively
2 and did not disclose to the Investors was material because there was a substantial
3 likelihood that the Investors would consider it important when deciding whether to approve
4 the Senior Notes and the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures. In addition,
5 the information impacted the information that had been made available to the Investors.
6

7 882. Had the Investors known the true state of the Company's financial affairs,
8 they would not have approved the Senior Notes and the 2007 Series C Subordinated
9 Convertible Debentures.
10

11 883. These measures subordinated the Investors' interests in the event of
12 nonpayment and / or bankruptcy. In addition, they increased the Company's overall debt,
13 which eventually necessitated the bankruptcy filing.
14

15 884. McGrath and the 2007 Board's breach of their fiduciary duty to disclose
16 information fully and fairly has damaged the Investors.
17

18 885. McGrath and the 2007 Board are jointly and severally liable for these
19 damages.
20

21 886. The Investors have standing to pursue these damages directly because the
22 acts alleged caused injury to them as Investors, not to the Company itself.
23

24 887. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these
25 violations until a reasonable time after the bankruptcy filing in September 2009 because
26 McGrath and the 2007 Board, through McGrath's representations and omissions and the
27 2007 Board's actions and inactions, led the Investors away from the truth regarding the
28

1 Company's finances and were entrusted by the Investors to exercise competence and act in
2 good faith as fiduciaries.

3 CLAIM XVII

4 Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Nondisclosure

5 (By All Investors Against McGrath and 2004⁹–2009 Boards)

6 888. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
7 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

8 889. McGrath and the Boards were under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and
9 fairly all material information within their control when describing the facts and
10 circumstances surrounding the subject offerings, particularly with respect to the state of the
11 Company's business and financial affairs.

12 890. This duty was owed both to debt and equity holders because, upon
13 information and belief, the Company was insolvent or in the zone of insolvency at all
14 material times when making the offerings and withholding other material information
15 about the state of the Company's business and financial affairs.

16 891. Additionally, to the extent that the Securities were convertible debentures,
17 they were hybrid debt-equity securities that triggered fiduciary duties.

18 892. McGrath and the Boards breached this duty by selectively communicating
19 information about the Company's finances and failing to disclose other information that
20 was material to the Investors in connection with subject offerings.

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28 ⁹ For purposes of all claims in this Complaint, the Defendants from the 2004
and 2005 Boards include: (1) Greg McGrath; (2) Sean D. Curran; (3) Charles V. Shamblee
III; and (4) J. Robert Routt.

1 893. The information that McGrath and the Boards communicated selectively and
2 did not disclose to the Investors was material because there was a substantial likelihood
3 that the Investors would consider it important when deciding whether to invest in the
4 subject offerings. In addition, the lack of disclosure impacted the information that had
5 been made available to the Investors.
6

7 894. Had the Investors known the true state of the Company's financial affairs,
8 they would not have invested in the subject offerings.
9

10 895. These investments subordinated the Investors' interests in the event of
11 nonpayment and / or bankruptcy. In addition, they increased the Company's overall debt,
12 which eventually necessitated the bankruptcy filing.
13

14 896. McGrath and the Boards' breach of their fiduciary duty to disclose
15 information fully and fairly has damaged the Investors.
16

17 897. McGrath and the Boards are jointly and severally liable for these damages.
18

19 898. The Investors have standing to pursue these damages directly because the
20 acts alleged caused injury to them as Investors, not to the Company itself.

21 899. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these
22 violations until a reasonable time after the bankruptcy filing in September 2009 because
23 McGrath and the Boards, through McGrath's representations and omissions and the
24 Boards' actions and inactions, led the Investors away from the truth regarding the
25 Company's finances and were entrusted by the Investors to exercise competence and act in
26 good faith as fiduciaries.
27
28

CLAIM XVIII**Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Nondisclosure****(By Investors in 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures
Against Buettin and Thistleton)**

900. Buettin and Thistleton were under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and fairly all material information within their control when describing the facts and circumstances surrounding the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures, particularly with respect to the state of the Company's business and financial affairs.

901. This duty was owed to Investors in the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures as debt holders because, upon information and belief, the Company was insolvent or in the zone of insolvency at all material times when they made representations about the offering and withheld other material information about the state of the Company's business and financial affairs.

902. Buettin and Thistleton breached this duty by selectively communicating information about the Company's finances and failing to disclose other information that was material to the Investors in connection with the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.

903. The information that Buettin and Thistleton communicated selectively and did not disclose to the Investors was material because there was a substantial likelihood that the Investors would consider it important when deciding whether to invest in the subject offerings. In addition, the lack of disclosure impacted the information that had been made available to the Investors.

1 904. Had the Investors known the true state of the Company's financial affairs,
2 including that the Company had been contemplating bankruptcy, had been informed by
3 investment banks that bankruptcy was necessary, and had approached DeWaay about
4 purchasing the Company's assets, they would not have invested in the 2008 Series D
5 Senior Subordinated Debentures.
6

7 905. These investments subordinated the Investors' interests in the event of
8 nonpayment and / or bankruptcy. In addition, they increased the Company's overall debt,
9 which eventually necessitated the bankruptcy filing.
10

11 906. Buettin and Thistleton's breach of their fiduciary duty to disclose information
12 fully and fairly has damaged the Investors.
13

14 907. Buettin and Thistleton are jointly and severally liable for these damages.
15

16 908. The Investors have standing to pursue these damages directly because the
17 acts alleged caused injury to them as Investors, not to the Company itself.
18

19 909. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these
20 violations until a reasonable time after the bankruptcy filing in September 2009 because
21 Buettin and Thistleton led the Investors away from the truth regarding the Company's
22 finances and were entrusted by the Investors to exercise competence and act in good faith
23 as fiduciaries.
24

25 ...

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CLAIM XIX

Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Disloyalty and Bad Faith

(By All Investors Against McGrath)

910. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

911. As an officer of the Company, McGrath owed a duty to act with loyalty and in good faith when managing the Company.

912. McGrath breached this duty by making representations about the Company's finances in the form of inaccurate and / or misleading projections and incorrect statements about the Company's financial and business affairs.

913. When taking these actions, McGrath elevated his own interests above the interests of the Company, particularly to the extent that he stood to benefit from the growth of the Company directly through the exercise of warrants and stock options without the risks of investing in the Company and indirectly through the substantial interests held by his wife and family members, or he intentionally acted with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.

914. McGrath also consciously or intentionally disregarded his responsibilities as President, which required him to correct inaccurate statements.

915. McGrath's breach of his fiduciary duty through these actions caused injury to all debt and equity holders in the Company, who were owed equal fiduciary duties because, upon information and belief, the Company was insolvent or in the zone of insolvency at all material times.

1 916. McGrath is liable for these damages.

2 917. The Investors have standing to pursue these damages directly because the
3
4 acts alleged caused injury to them as Investors, not to the Company itself.

5 918. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these
6
7 violations until a reasonable time after the bankruptcy filing in September 2009 because
8
9 McGrath, through his representations and omissions, led the Investors away from the truth
10
11 regarding the Company's finances and was entrusted by the Investors to exercise
12 competence and act in good faith as a fiduciary.

13 CLAIM XX

14 Breach of Fiduciary Duty for Disloyalty and Bad Faith

15 (By All Investors Against 2004-2009 Boards)

16 919. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
17 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

18 920. The Boards had a fiduciary duty to act with loyalty and in good faith when
19
20 managing the Company.

21 921. The Boards breached this fiduciary duty when they approved the subject debt
22
23 and equity offerings, including the Common Units, Class A Units, Class B Units, 2005
24 Series C Subordinated Convertible Debentures, 2006 Series D Subordinated Convertible
25 Debentures, Common Stock in Domin-8 Inc., Series A Preferred Stock, the 2007 Series A
26 and Series B Subordinated Debentures, the 2007 Series C Subordinated Convertible
27 Debentures, and the 2008 Series D Senior Subordinated Debentures.
28

1 922. Upon information and belief, the Boards also breached this duty when they
2 approved the financial projections and information disseminated in connection with the
3 subject offerings, which they knew or should have known were inaccurate and / or
4 reasonably misleading, and did not stop McGrath from making representations related to
5 the same in connection with the subject debt and equity offerings.
6

7 923. When taking these actions, the Boards elevated their own interests above the
8 interests of the Company, particularly to the extent that they stood to benefit from the
9 growth of the Company through the exercise of warrants and stock options without the
10 risks of investing in the Company, or intentionally acted with a purpose other than that of
11 advancing the best interests of the corporation.
12

13 924. The Boards also consciously or intentionally disregarded their responsibilities
14 because they did not stop McGrath from making representations regarding the Company's
15 finances and business affairs, which they knew or should have known were inaccurate in
16 light of the financial state of the Company and its performance in relation to projections,
17 and did not take measures to correct the same.
18

19 925. Further, the Boards' failure to exercise proper oversight with respect to
20 McGrath's representations was sustained and systematic so as to amount to bad faith.
21

22 926. The Boards' breach of their fiduciary duty through these actions caused
23 injury to all debt and equity holders in the Company, who were owed equal fiduciary duties
24 because, upon information and belief, the Company was insolvent or in the zone of
25 insolvency at all material times.
26

27 927. The Boards are jointly and severally liable for these damages.
28

1 company or intentionally acted with a purpose other than that of advancing the best
2 interests of the corporation.

3
4 934. Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign also consciously or intentionally disregarded
5 their responsibilities because they did not take measures to correct these breaches.

6
7 935. Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign's breach of their fiduciary duty through these
8 actions caused injury to all debt and equity holders in the Company, who were owed equal
9 fiduciary duties because, upon information and belief, the Company was insolvent or in the
10 zone of insolvency at all material times.

11
12 936. Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign are jointly and severally liable for these
13 damages.

14
15 937. The Investors have standing to pursue these damages directly because the
16 acts alleged caused injury to them as Investors, not to the Company itself.

17
18 938. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these
19 violations until a reasonable time after the bankruptcy filing in September 2009 because
20 Buettin, Thistleton, and Ensign led the Investors away from the truth regarding the
21 Company's finances and were entrusted by the Investors to exercise competence and act in
22 good faith as fiduciaries.

23 CLAIM XXII

24 Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty

25 (By All Investors Against DeWaay Entities, D8 Entities, and Labine)

26
27 939. The Investors incorporate by reference, as though fully set forth herein, each
28 and every preceding allegation of this Complaint.

1 940. The directors and officers of the Company, including McGrath, Buettin,
2 Thistleton, Ensign, and the Boards, owed fiduciary duties to the Investors.

3 941. The directors and officers of the Company breached these fiduciary duties by
4 taking the acts alleged herein, with the assistance of DeWaay and Labine.

5 942. Upon information and belief, DeWaay and Labine, on behalf of the D8
6 Entities, and Labine, as an independent securities broker, participated in the breach of these
7 duties, particularly to the extent that they participated in the sale of the subject offerings,
8 which had been approved and recommended by the directors and officers of the Company,
9 and subsequently attempted to purchase the assets of the Company if it agreed to file
10 bankruptcy, which it did.

11 943. DeWaay and Labine's participation in these activities has damaged the
12 Investors, who have lost all or a substantial portion of their investments in the subject
13 offerings as a consequence of participating in the offerings and the Company filing
14 bankruptcy.

15 944. The DeWaay Entities, D8 Entities, and Labine are liable for these damages
16 and may be held jointly and severally liable for the same if it is determined that they
17 knowingly aided and abetted the breach of the fiduciary duty.

18 945. The Investors have standing to pursue these damages directly because the
19 acts alleged caused injury to them as Investors, not to the Company itself.

20 946. The Investors did not and could not have reasonably discovered these
21 violations until a reasonable time after the bankruptcy filing in September 2009 because the
22 Company's directors and officers led the Investors away from the truth regarding the
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1 Company's finances and entrusted the by the Investors to exercise competence and act in
 2 good faith as fiduciaries.

3 **WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff Investors respectfully request judgment in their favor as
 4 follows:
 5

- 6 a) Awarding Plaintiffs actual damages, plus any consequential damages,
 7 in an amount to be determined at trial;
 8
 9 b) Awarding Plaintiffs their attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this
 10 lawsuit to the extent they are available under the law;
 11
 12 c) Awarding Plaintiffs such other and further relief that this Court deems
 13 just and proper; and
 14
 15 d) Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on all amounts
 16 awarded to Plaintiffs from the earliest dates allowed by law.

17 **DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

18 Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial with respect to their Complaint.
 19

20 DATED this 14th day of June 2011.
 21

22 **MACK DRUCKER & WATSON, P.L.C.**

23
 24 By /S/ Dax R. Watson

25 Dax R. Watson
 26 Gregory M. Monaco
 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

27 ...

28 ...

1 **ORIGINAL** of the foregoing filed via
2 the Court's electronic filing system this
3 **14th** day of June 2011.
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5

6 /s/ Berlinda Corpora
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